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We present an in-depth analysis regarding the error resistance and optimization of our all-
optical Bell measurement and ultrafast long-distance quantum communication scheme proposed
in [arXiv:1503.06777]. In order to promote our previous proposal from loss- to fault-tolerance, we
introduce a general and compact formalism that can also be applied to other related schemes (in-
cluding non-all-optical ones such as [PRL 112, 250501]). With the help of this new representation
we show that our communication protocol does not only counteract the inevitable photon loss dur-
ing channel transmission, but is also able to resist common experimental errors such as Pauli-type
errors (bit- and phase-flips) and detector inefficiencies (losses and dark counts). Furthermore, we
demonstrate that on the physical level of photonic qubits the choice of the standard linear optical
Bell measurement with its limited efficiency is optimal for our setting in the sense that, apart from
their potential use in state preparation, more advanced Bell measurements yield only a small de-
crease in resource consumption. We devise two state generation schemes that provide the required
ancillary encoded Bell states (quasi-)on-demand at every station. The schemes are either based on
nonlinear optics or on linear optics with multiplexing and exhibit resource costs that scale linearly
or less than quadratic with the number of photons per encoded qubit, respectively. Finally, we show
that it is possible to operate our communication scheme with on-off detectors instead of employing
photon-number-resolving detectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two conceptual, theoretical breakthroughs were made
15 years ago with regards to the implementation of quan-
tum computation and communication. Knill, Laflamme,
and Milburn (KLM) showed that, quite surprisingly at
that time, linear optical elements such as beam split-
ters and phase shifters are sufficient for universal quan-
tum computation [1]. Duan, Lukin, Cirac, and Zoller
(DLCZ) demonstrated that also quantum communica-
tion over large distances can be, in principle, achieved
by means of linear optics together with atomic-ensemble
quantum memories [2].
A crucial element in either scheme is quantum error
detection (QED). In the DLCZ quantum repeater, entan-
gled states are distributed over sufficiently small channel
segments and then connected by entanglement swapping,
where the primary source of errors is loss, especially dur-
ing the transmission of the photonic states. Such chan-
nel losses can be immediately detected during the ini-
tial entanglement distribution step, while memory losses
are suppressed later during the entanglement swapping
procedure (or at the latest through a final postselec-
tion step). This way long-distance quantum communi-
cation (LDQC) becomes possible, as opposed to using
direct quantum communication without QED and with-
out memories where the transmission rate would drop
exponentially with distance.
Could it be useful to replace QED by quantum error
correction (QEC) for LDQC? First of all, the original
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quantum repeater idea [3, 4] emphasized the fact that,
in contrast to scalable quantum computation, scalable
quantum communication is possible with the help of en-
tanglement purification, corresponding to a form of QED
against both channel losses and local gate errors, with no
need for many levels of additional complex QEC codes.
This huge simplification, however, comes at a price: en-
tanglement purification is probabilistic and so are typ-
ically the entanglement distribution over lossy channel
segments (including the local state preparations) and the
subsequent entanglement swappings (at least when re-
stricted to linear optics) [5]. As a consequence, this type
of nested quantum repeater is extremely slow, relying on
two-way classical communication and long-lived quantum
memories. In fact, to scale up their scheme to larger
distances, DLCZ need sufficiently good atomic-ensemble
memories at every repeater station in order to store the
initial entangled states until other entanglement distri-
butions and connections succeed. While certain varia-
tions of the original DLCZ scheme lead to a significant
improvement of the repeater rates [6], conceptually, this
type of quantum repeater is fundamentally limited by
the long waiting times for the heralding signals at every
repeater node.
In recent years, various proposals have been made to
employ QEC codes for LDQC. Since these codes sup-
press errors deterministically, long waiting times and two-
way classical communication (and hence the use of quan-
tum memories) can be, in principle, completely avoided.
While one class of schemes focused on the correction
of operational errors with channel losses still suppressed
through heralded distribution and purification of entan-
glement [7–10], another class did include QEC against
transmission losses making high-rate loss-tolerant [11–
13] or even fully fault-tolerant [14–17] LDQC possible.
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2These latter schemes are limited only by the speed of
the local gate operations and thus, they approach rates
as obtainable in classical communication. Our scheme
also belongs to this class and allows for ultrafast LDQC,
but unlike Refs. [11, 14, 15] it does so in an all-optical
fashion without the use of difficult local quantum gates
(implementable via local nonlinear matter-light interac-
tions [11, 15]).
For this purpose, by employing a certain version of
loss-tolerant parity-codes [11, 15, 18], we suggest to send
encoded qubit states directly, which are then subject
to a Bell measurement (BM) together with locally pre-
pared, encoded Bell states after every few kilometers (see
Fig. 1). These local state teleportations allow for a non-
destructive loss-error syndrome detection and a qubit
state recovery in one step. The use of QEC by telepor-
tation [19] along the channel is conceptually similar to
the protocol of Ref. [15]. However, in our scheme, every
teleportation is performed with optical (encoded) Bell
states and linear optical elements [20]. It turns out that
the encoding has two positive effects: the larger the code
is, the more efficient the ideal BM (despite the linear-
optics constraint [21]) and the higher the amount of tol-
erable photon loss become (despite the increasing photon
number of the codewords). In contrast to the all-optical
scheme of Ref. [12], our logical BMs are conceptually dif-
ferent and work entirely without feedforward. This does
not only reduce the local operation times, but also makes
on-chip integration along an optical fiber channel more
feasible, as optical switching in this case is very sensi-
tive to loss [22, 23]. We emphasize that our scheme, as
originally developed in Ref. [24] with mainly the effect
of transmission loss under investigation, is the only all-
photonic forward error-correcting quantum communica-
tion scheme so far (the scheme of Ref. [12] relies upon
error correction on entangled states distributed among
neighboring stations).
Here we show that our scheme is also fault-tolerant
against various kinds of error sources beyond transmis-
sion loss. In addition to an extensive investigation of our
schemes’ performance in the presence of loss, including
a comparison to the recent benchmarks of repeaterless
quantum communication [25, 26] which even very small
instances of our code (with only eight photons per log-
ical qubit) can beat, we develop a toolbox to analyze
other, more general errors. This very general toolbox,
which is not restricted to our all-optical approach but
can be used for every QPC-based one-way communica-
tion scheme (e.g. the one presented in [15]), allows us
to demonstrate that our communication scheme is fault-
tolerant with respect to Pauli-type errors and detector in-
efficiencies (such as lossy detectors and dark counts), i.e.,
the most common operational errors in optical quantum
information processing schemes. Since we are also con-
cerned with minimizing the experimental requirements
of our scheme, we explore the use of on-off-detectors in-
stead of photon-number-resolving detectors in our BM.
We find that this replacement is indeed possible, pro-
vided the code size is adjusted accordingly. Furthermore,
we investigate the use of more advanced BM schemes on
the single-photon level [27–29] and find that, although
more complicated BM schemes can allow for the use of
smaller error correction codes, the resource cost reduc-
tion associated with this code size decrease is most prob-
ably not worth the additional experimental effort of the
more advanced BM schemes. However, when consider-
ing the experimental costs for generating the required
encoded Bell states at every repeater station, the use of
more advanced BM schemes can yield significant advan-
tages. We present two different schemes to prepare the
encoded Bell states. One is based on nonlinear optics,
utilizing coherent photon conversion [30], and exhibits a
linear resource cost scaling with respect to the number
of photons per logical qubit. The second scheme is based
solely on single-photon sources, linear optical elements,
and the use of multiplexing and feedforward. Advanced
BM schemes allow to reduce the quadratic cost scaling
of this state generation scheme to a much-closer-to-linear
one, which in turn reduces the number of required single-
photon sources by several orders of magnitude. Our log-
ical BM may also be employed for gate teleportation
in the context of quantum computation. In Ref. [24],
we already discussed that such a generalization is sub-
tle and the intrinsic loss resistance of the BM scheme
has to be sacrificed at the expense of quantum computa-
tional universality. Moreover, feedforward operations are
needed, though to a smaller extent compared to schemes
like KLM [1]. In this work here, we exclusively focus on
quantum communication.
This work is structured as follows. In Sec. II we present
the general idea of our communication scheme and give
an overview of the errors we expect to occur within our
setup. Section III focuses on the quantum error correc-
tion code we use - the quantum parity code (QPC) - and
its behavior under loss and Pauli errors. In Sec. IV we
investigate the central building block of our communica-
tion scheme: the all-optical BM on the encoded qubits
which is required for the teleportation that performs the
error correction step. We show that the BM efficiency ap-
proaches one with increasing code size and that the BM
still has high success rates if (some but not too many)
photons are lost. In order to treat errors other than loss,
in Sec. V we develop a toolbox to analyze how errors on
the single-photon level propagate through the different
encoding levels and lead to errors on the encoded qubits.
This toolbox is applied to various error models in Sec. VI.
There we show that our error correction scheme does not
only take care of the inevitable photon loss during trans-
mission, but also gives resistance to depolarizing errors
and faulty photon detectors. Additionally, we demon-
strate that the requirement of photon-number-resolving
detectors can be dropped and on-off detectors can be
used, provided the code size is chosen accordingly. Fi-
nally, we conclude with a summary of our results.
In the Appendices we provide proofs of several formu-
las given in the main text, especially the representation of
3encoded Bell states in terms of two-photon Bell states on
which our error analysis relies. Furthermore, two appen-
dices are dedicated to the two state generation schemes
described above. We give a detailed description of how
coherent photon conversion or linear optics with multi-
plexing can be utilized to obtain the encoded Bell states
at every repeater station. We also investigate the re-
source cost scaling of the two schemes. Finally, we give a
detailed view on how dark counts affect the capabilities
of the standard linear-optical BM on the single-photon
level.
II. THE COMMUNICATION SCHEME
To send quantum information in the form of an arbi-
trary (flying, i.e. optical) qubit state over a total distance
Ltot we propose to employ a quantum error correction
code that is specifically designed to correct photon loss
[15]. We have found the quantum parity code (QPC, see
Sec. III) to be an excellent candidate for this. The quan-
tum state stored in this code is sent directly through the
communication channel (without prior distribution of a
long-distance entangled state). To counteract the loss
of photons from the transmission, repeater stations are
placed after every channel segment of length L0. At ev-
ery station an encoded Bell state |φ0,0〉(n,m) is available
on demand (i.e., created and consumed locally), and a
logical BM is performed on one half of the Bell state
together with the incoming encoded qubit (see Fig. 1).
Whenever the BM succeeds the qubit state (up to an her-
alded Pauli error) is teleported to the other half of the
repeater station’s Bell state which is then sent onward to
the next station. Since the Bell state was created locally,
the outgoing qubit state does not carry any of the errors
the incoming qubit state might have had. Therefore, the
teleportation acts like an error correction scheme [19].
The heralded Pauli error that the BM might induce can
be kept and need not be corrected immediately. As long
as the information on which errors occurred at the sta-
tions is kept (i.e., the knowledge of the Pauli frame), a
final Pauli correction at the receiver is sufficient and any
additional, experimentally demanding feed-forward pro-
cedures are avoided. It is crucial to our scheme that the
BM has both a high success probability and a tolerance
to errors in the incoming qubit. We found that the QPC
code allows for an easy-to-implement all-optical BM that
fulfills both of these requirements (see Secs. IV - VI).
Regarding the errors that occur in our scheme we
make the usual assumption that the error operators act
independently on the individual physical qubits. The
main error source to be dealt with is photon loss due
to the channel transmission. Every photon that is sent
over a channel segment of length L0 suffers from poten-
tial loss according to a transmission coefficient of ηt =
exp(−L0/Latt) (with attenuation length Latt = 22 km).
Those photons that are part of the ancillary Bell state in
a repeater station, consumed locally in a BM, are not
|in〉(n,m) R
L0
R
L0
R X
Repeater Station
BML
|φ0,0〉(n,m)
(a)
(b)
FIG. 1. One-way communication scheme: (a) To send a quan-
tum state |in〉(n,m) over a long distance, repeater stations (R)
at shorter distances L0 are used to recover an incoming qubit
from accumulated losses (fading arrows). A classical signal
(double line) defines a single Pauli correction X at the re-
ceiver (not necessarily a bit flip). (b) Each repeater station
is equipped with an encoded Bell state which in our first,
simplest model is not corrupted by loss. A highly efficient,
loss-resistant, logical Bell Measurement (BML) acting on the
incoming signal and one half of the Bell state is performed.
The other half of the Bell state is sent to the next station
along with a classical signal containing the result of the BM.
subject to the transmission loss channel. However, a
variety of other errors may also be present that do not
occur during the transmission but locally within the re-
peater station (potentially acting on both the incoming
qubit and the locally created Bell states). The errors we
are concerned with can roughly be classified into three
groups: (i) The loss-type errors, which include the al-
ready mentioned transmission loss but also losses through
misalignment of optical equipment or errors in the state
generation that lead to missing photons in the ancillary
Bell states. In contrast to transmission loss, the two lat-
ter types of errors are independent of the repeater spac-
ing L0. (ii) The Pauli-type errors that do not affect the
total number of photons in an encoded qubit, but be-
come manifest in the form of bit-flips or phase-flips on
the single-photon (physical single-qubit) level, which is
a common error model in all quantum information pro-
cessing protocols. (iii) Detector errors, especially lossy
detectors, which can also be seen as part of the first class
of errors, and dark counts.
To investigate the performance of our communication
scheme in the presence of errors it is useful to shift the
point of view from the actual error channels to the out-
come probabilities of the BM in each repeater station.
These can be calculated by merging all error types that
occur on the optical modes participating in the BM. Par-
ticularly, this means that the errors on the ancillary Bell
states can be split in two halves. Those photons that
are consumed locally in the BM and the errors related
with these, are assigned to the BM in this repeater sta-
tion, whereas the errors on the other half of the Bell state
which is sent onward to the next station are assigned to
the BM there. This splitting is possible because of the
above assumption that all errors occur only on the single-
photon level and are independent of each other. Since
4the various loss channels and Pauli-type errors, governed
by a depolarizing error channel, commute, a single error
channel for every group of errors suffices to model all er-
rors that occur during state generation, transmission and
BM.
III. THE QUANTUM PARITY CODE
In our proposal we use the quantum parity code
QPC(n,m) to protect quantum information from loss
and other sources of errors. Several versions of this
code have been used before [11, 15, 18], but we found
the one which is also used in Ref. [15] to be the most
suitable for our purposes. It encodes a logical qubit
into nm physical qubits. The code can be understood
as having three different levels of encoding. On the
lowest level, which we call the physical level, we have
standard dual-rail (two-mode) qubits. These are typi-
cally realized by two orthogonal polarization modes of
photons {|0〉 = |H〉 , |1〉 = |V 〉}, but also other re-
alizations like spatial or temporal modes are possible.
On the second level of encoding, the block level, m
physical qubits are collected to represent a block-qubit
{|0〉(m) = |H〉⊗m , |1〉(m) = |V 〉⊗m}. This repetition part
of the code is crucial for the loss robustness as we will see
later. The highest encoding level is the logical level. Here
n block-qubits are used to construct the logical qubits
as |±〉(n,m) =
(
|0〉(m) ± |1〉(m)
)⊗n
/
√
2n = (|±〉(m))⊗n.
The codewords are then naturally obtained by |±〉∗ =(|0〉∗ ± |1〉∗) /√2, where the ∗ denotes the encoding level
(blank for physical, (m) for block and (n,m) for logical).
In all three encoding levels the four Bell states are de-
fined as
|φk,l〉∗ = 1√2
(|0, k〉∗ + (−1)l |1, 1− k〉∗) , (1)
with k, l ∈ {0, 1}. It can be shown (see Appendix A)
that the Bell states of the higher encoding levels can be
represented in terms of Bell states of the lower encoding
levels
|φk,l〉(m) ∼= 1√
2m−1
∑
~r∈Al,m
m⊗
i=1
|φk,ri〉 , (2)
|φk,l〉(n,m) ∼= 1√
2n−1
∑
~s∈Ak,n
n⊗
i=1
|φsi,l〉(m) , (3)
where the index set is defined as Al,m =
{ ~r ∈ {0, 1}m |∑mi=1 ri = l (mod 2) }.
This representation of encoded Bell states in terms of
lower level Bell states is the basis on which the efficiency
of the logical Bell measurement rests (see section IV).
Note that the above representations (2),(3) are only
true after an appropriate reordering of the modes (indi-
cated by ∼=). Quite naturally, the photons of two logical
qubits in a Bell state are paired with their equivalent:
photon i in block j of the logical qubit A forms a Bell
state with photon i in block j of the logical qubit B.
In the remainder of this paper this reordering will be
omitted in the notation (with the exception of the next
example).
As an example we take a closer look at QPC(2,2). The
codewords on the three encoding levels are |0〉 = |H〉,
|1〉 = |V 〉 on the physical level, |0〉(2) = |HH〉, |1〉(2) =
|V V 〉 on the block level and
|0〉(2,2) = 1√
2
(|HHHH〉+ |V V V V 〉) (4)
|1〉(2,2) = 1√
2
(|HHV V 〉+ |V V HH〉) . (5)
on the logical level. To illustrate the Bell state represen-
tations and the mode reordering consider the block level
Bell state
|φ1,1〉(2) = 1√2 (|HHV V 〉 − |V V HH〉) . (6)
The representation (2) yields
|φ1,1〉(2) ∼= 1√2 (|φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉+ |φ1,1〉 |φ1,0〉) (7)
= 1√
2
(|HVHV 〉 − |V HV H〉) .
These two forms only coincide after the modes 2 and 3
have been interchanged. Similarly, modes 3 and 4 have
to be interchanged with modes 5 and 6 (i.e. block 2 with
block 3) to get
|φ1,1〉(2,2) = 1√2
(
|φ0,1〉(2) |φ1,1〉(2) + |φ1,1〉(2) |φ0,1〉(2)
)
(8)
on the logical level.
As mentioned above, the main purpose of the QPC-
code is to protect the quantum information from photon
loss and other error sources. Assume a (potentially un-
known) quantum state |ψ〉 = α |0〉(2,2) + β |1〉(2,2) is sent
over a lossy channel and a photon, say the one of the
first physical qubit, is lost. |ψ〉 is then projected onto the
mixed state
|ψ〉 〈ψ| → 12 [ (α |0HHH〉+ β |0HV V 〉)× h.c.
+ (α |0V V V 〉+ β |0V HH〉)× h.c.]. (9)
Here we used the common notation 0 to describe the
vacuum state in mode 1. It should not be confused with
the state of the physical qubit |0〉 = |H〉 used outside of
this example. The mixed state above consists of states
from two error spaces, which can be identified by the
photon in mode 2 (the remaining photon of block 1). In
both of the error spaces the quantum information, i.e.
the superposition with the complex amplitudes α and β
is still available. Therefore the original state |ψ〉 can be
restored by error correction (the details of this will be
outlined in section IV). If, however, a second photon is
5lost as well, the quantum information is lost: either the
second photon of block 1 is lost and |ψ〉 becomes
1
2 [ (α |00HH〉+ β |00V V 〉)× h.c.
+ (α |00V V 〉+ β |00HH〉)× h.c.], (10)
which means the error spaces can no longer be discrim-
inated (and a random bit-flip error remains), or one of
the photons of block 2, say photon 3, is lost and one gets
1
2 (|α|2 |0H0H〉 × h.c.+ |β|2 |0H0V 〉 × h.c.
+ |α|2 |0V 0V 〉 × h.c.+ |β|2 |0V 0H〉 × h.c.) (11)
and the superposition is lost. This generalizes to higher
QPC(n,m)-codes in the following way. In all of the n
blocks at least one of the m photons must remain to
identify the correct error space. Additionally in at least
one of the blocks all m photons must remain to preserve
the superposition with the amplitudes α and β.
Most errors other than loss can be described with the
help of Pauli errors, i.e. bit-flips and phase-flips, on the
physical level. To correct these, larger QPC codes are
necessary. If, for example, a Pauli-X-error occurs on the
first photon |ψ〉 becomes
α√
2
(|V HHH〉+ |HV V V 〉) + β√
2
(|V HV V 〉+ |HVHH〉).
(12)
However, a state of the same error space is obtained from
an X-error on the second photon,
α√
2
(|HVHH〉+ |V HV V 〉) + β√
2
(|HV V V 〉+ |V HHH〉),
(13)
but the amplitudes α and β are flipped. Thus the initial
state cannot be recovered reliably. Similarly, phase flips
on photons 1 and 3 lead to the same error space, but
to different amplitudes: (α, β) ↔ (α,−β). The smallest
QPC code that can reliably correct a single Pauli-error
is QPC(3,3).
As a final note on the properties of the QPC codes
we take a look at Pauli-errors on the logical level. They
occur frequently as a result of the teleportation but can
easily be corrected by appropriate combinations of Pauli
gates on the physical level:
X(n,m) = X⊗m ⊗ 1⊗(n−1)m (14)
Z(n,m) =
(
Z ⊗ 1⊗m−1)⊗n (15)
IV. BELL MEASUREMENTS ON QPC
The main component of our communication scheme
is the local teleportation at every repeater station that
acts as an error correction. To perform this teleportation
a BM, i.e. a projection onto the four Bell states (1),
however, on the logical level, is required. The Bell state
representations (2) and (3) show that a logical BM can
(b)(a) HVVH(c)
FIG. 2. Block structure and Bell measurement (BM): (a) The
block structure for two QPC(2,2)-qubits. The polarization
qubits on the left (red) belong to the incoming signal and are
thus subject to channel errors, while those on the right (blue)
are part of the encoded Bell state provided in each repeater
station. (b) In a Bell state in QPC-encoding the qubits are
joined blockwise. The dashed ellipses highlight physical-level
qubit pairs that are combined at the BM. (c) Optical BM
setup on the physical level adapted to polarization encoding.
be done via nm parallel BMs on the physical level: every
pattern of results on the physical level is either unique
to one of the logical Bell states, or it indicates that some
kind of error must have occurred.
Let us first take a look at the efficiency of the BM in
the case that no errors occur. It has been known for
quite some time that the maximal efficiency of a BM on
dual-rail qubits with standard linear optical tools (beam
splitters, phase shifters and photon detectors) is limited
to one half [21]. The BMs on the physical level of our
scheme are subject to this limit, but thanks to the form
of the QPC the logical BMs are not, and can reach ef-
ficiencies arbitrarily close to one. The standard BM on
polarization-encoded qubits, depicted in Fig. 2 (c), con-
sists of a 50:50 beam splitter, followed by two polarizing
beam splitters that reflect vertically polarized photons,
and 4 photon detectors. If a |φ0,l〉-state enters the BM,
both photons will be directed to a single detector, inde-
pendent of l. The states |φ1,0〉 and |φ1,1〉 lead to clicks in
two detectors: one for vertically and one for horizontally
polarized photons. If the clicks are on the same side of the
setup (defined by the output modes of the beam splitter),
it was a |φ1,0〉-state, whereas for |φ1,1〉 the photons end up
on opposing sides. This shows that the physical BM un-
ambiguously identifies the index k of the Bell state |φk,l〉
but the index l is identified if and only if k = 1. Later, in
Sec. VI D, we shall also consider advanced BM schemes
that sometimes can also distinguish the |φ0,l〉-states and
their influence on our communication protocol.
On the block level the BM for the state |φk,l〉(m) will
be successful if k is identified correctly in at least one
of the physical BMs, since its value is the same in all
of them (see Eq. (2)), and if the values ri are identified
correctly in every physical BM. The first condition will
always be met, but the second one only if k = 1. Thus,
the block BM has the same efficiency of one half as the
physical BM. On the logical level |φk,l〉(n,m), however, the
identification of l only has to be successful in one block,
while the identification of si must succeed in every block
6(see Eq. (3)). The latter will always be accomplished and
the first condition will be met almost every time: The
only case where it is not fulfilled is si = 0 ∀i. The Bell
state representation (3) shows that this case can only
occur in the logical Bell states |φ1,l〉(n,m) and in these
only in one of the 2n−1 terms of the superposition. Thus,
the efficiency of the logical BM in the case of no errors is
pBM, ideal =
2 + 2
(
1− 2−(n−1))
4
= 1− 2−n. (16)
This approaches one with an increasing number of blocks
n.
As an example we again choose the code QPC(2, 2).
The block Bell states can be written as
|φk,0〉(2) = 1√2 (|φk,0〉 |φk,0〉+ |φk,1〉 |φk,1〉) , (17)
|φk,1〉(2) = 1√2 (|φk,0〉 |φk,1〉+ |φk,1〉 |φk,0〉) . (18)
For k = 0 all physical Bell states involved are |φ0,l〉-
states, which cannot be identified unambiguously. In con-
trast, for k = 1 all physical states are |φ1,l〉-states and
will always be identified correctly. Therefore the block
level BM exhibits exactly the same behavior as the stan-
dard physical BM. On the logical level, however, we get
the following:
|φ0,l〉(2,2) = 1√2
(
|φ0,l〉(2)|φ0,l〉(2)+|φ1,l〉(2)|φ1,l〉(2)
)
,
(19)
|φ1,l〉(2,2) = 1√2
(
|φ0,l〉(2)|φ1,l〉(2)+|φ1,l〉(2)|φ0,l〉(2)
)
.
(20)
For the states |φ1,l〉(2,2) there is at least one block state
|φ1,l〉(2) in every summand of the superposition, which is
enough to identify l and therefore the Bell state. Thus,
the fully encoded logical |φ1,l〉(2,2)-states can still be per-
fectly distinguished, just like |φ1,l〉 and |φ1,l〉(2). How-
ever, for the states |φ0,l〉(2,2) the index l can only be iden-
tified in the second summand. Thus, the states |φ0,l〉(2,2)
will be identifiable in half of all cases. This yields an
overall efficiency of the logical BM of 75%.
As already mentioned before, the size m of the blocks
does not influence the success rate of the logical BM, if
no errors are present. However, as pointed out in Sec. III,
it is crucial to preserve a good BM efficiency also in the
presence of losses and other errors. Let us assume the
incoming photon in the first mode of the first block was
lost during transmission. The physical BM this photon
was headed to will then detect only a single photon and
report this loss. It is important to note at this point that
the photon detectors must be able to resolve between a
single and two photons. Otherwise, the loss of a photon
cannot be distinguished from an intact |φ0,l〉-state. In
Sec. VI E we shall also discuss the possibility of using on-
off detectors. Of course, no value of k and l can be found
in a physical BM, if a photon was lost. On the block
level, however, the index k can still be obtained from the
second physical BM in this block (see Eqs. (17) and (18)).
Only the value of l is unidentifiable here. On the logical
level the 50% chance of correctly identifying the states
|φ0,l〉(2,2) remains unchanged, since in the only summand
that can be useful for the correct identification of l there
is still a second term |φ1,l〉(2). On the other hand, for
the |φ1,l〉(2,2)-state, the second term of the superposition
becomes useless, since the remaining state |φ0,l〉(2) does
not allow for an identification of l, and thus the total suc-
cess rate drops to 50%. The same arguments hold for a
single loss of any other photon in the logical state. When
a second photon is also lost during the transmission we
find that the logical BM of the QPC(2, 2)-code will fail,
because either the information about k is inaccessible in
one of the blocks or none of the blocks provides informa-
tion about l (similar to the discussion in Sec. III). Only
if two photons are lost that were intended to take part
in the same physical BM, the logical BM can still suc-
ceed. But since only one of these photons is transmitted
in the first place, the second loss must be due to non-
unit-efficiency detectors (or any other type of local loss
mechanism). It is possible to calculate the BM success
rates for any code sizes n and m and an arbitrary num-
ber of losses and calculate transmission rates from these.
In fact, this was our original approach which is outlined
in the supplemental material of [prl]. However, for the
purpose of covering more general types of errors in the
context of our communication scheme, another point of
view is more useful. It is described in the next section.
V. ERROR ANALYSIS
In this section we describe a general method to calcu-
late the secure key rates of our communication scheme
when a certain error model is investigated. It will be
applied to various error models in Sec. VI. The idea of
this method is to first calculate the outcome probabilities
of the physical BMs from the error model, and then use
the Bell state representations (2) and (3) to calculate the
outcome probabilities of the BMs in the higher encoding
levels. Effectively, we explore how the errors that hap-
pen on the actual photons propagate through the various
levels of encoding. Finally, the outcome probabilities on
the logical level can be used to calculate the transmission
rate as well as the quantum bit error rate, which together
yield the secure key rate.
A. Propagation of errors
The outcome probability refers to the probability to
have a certain result in the BM when the entire error
channel is applied to the original, undisturbed Bell state
|φk,l〉∗. This undisturbed Bell state is a theoretical con-
struct and might not have existed at any point in time,
7because we assume the ancillary Bell states at every re-
peater station, each corresponding to one half of this
undisturbed Bell state, to be generated on demand. The
undisturbed Bell states merely provide a useful basis for
the logical two-qubit space of the incoming qubit and one
half of the ancillary Bell state. This approach allows us
to take into account the entire error channel in one step
(see also Sec. II).
The outcome probabilities on the three encoding
levels are stored in three matrices: P (physical), B
(block), and L (logical). In every matrix the column
defines the input state, while the row refers to the
BM result. Quite naturally, the sum of all entries of a
certain column must be one. Since the four Bell states
are distinguished by the two indices (k, l) (not to be
confused with the code parameters (n,m)) and ambigu-
ous results for both indices are possible, initially there
are in total nine possible BM outcomes on every level:
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (0, ?), (1, ?), (?, ?), (?, 0), (?, 1).
However, of these results, the last two, where the index l
is identified, but k is ambiguous, can never occur in the
standard BM and, due to the form of the QPC, are also
impossible on the higher encoding levels. For almost
every error model some of the results are inaccessible,
and we suppress them when displaying the matrix
elements Pu,v, Bu,v and Lu,v in tables. Nevertheless, the
index u will always range from 1 to 7 and correspond to
the position in the above list of BM outcomes.
As an example let us consider the case, where the only
error present is photon loss due to the channel transmis-
sion. The error channel for a single physical qubit is then
given by
ρ→ ηtρ+ (1− ηt) |vac〉 〈vac| , ηt = e−
L0
Latt , (21)
where Latt is the attenuation length of the optical fiber
(we assume Latt = 22 km in our calculations) and ηt is
the probability of the photon not to be lost during trans-
mission.
The probability of losing the photon (1 − ηt) is inde-
pendent of the actual Bell state entering the BM and the
loss is detected by the BM, since the detectors can dis-
tinguish between one and two photons. If one of the Bell
states |φ0,l〉 enters the BM, both photons are directed
to the same detector and no information about l can be
found. On the other hand, a |φ1,l〉-state will always be
identified correctly, provided the photon is not lost. This
gives the outcome probabilities P
(only loss)
u,v on the physical
level that are displayed in Table I.
To obtain the outcome probabilities Bu,v on the block
level from those on the physical level, we use the Bell
state representation (2) and an interpretation scheme
that is chosen depending on the corresponding error
model. This interpretation scheme determines, how com-
binations of BM results on the physical level should be
interpreted on the block level. For example, if in one of
the physical BMs a loss was detected, we are unable to
identify the second index l of that block. The interpreta-
tion scheme is given in the form of the expressions fu(γ)
and is incorporated in the following formulas via δfu(γ),
which should be understood as a restriction on an index
set. Here, u is the row index of the outcome probability
matrix B and γ ∈ N70 specifies how often every BM re-
sult occurrs on the physical level: γ1 =number of results
(0,0), γ2 = number of results (0,1), and so on. As a gen-
eral restriction we have |γ| = γ1 + ... + γ7 = m, where
m corresponds to the size of a block, and so, the total
number of physical BMs per block. In most cases, the
expressions fu(γ) are given as follows:
f1(γ) : γ1 + γ2 = m ∧ γ2 is even (0, 0)
f2(γ) : γ1 + γ2 = m ∧ γ2 is odd (0, 1)
f3(γ) : γ3 + γ4 = m ∧ γ4 is even (1, 0)
f4(γ) : γ3 + γ4 = m ∧ γ4 is odd (1, 1)
f5(γ) : γ1 + γ2 + γ5 > γ3 + γ4 + γ6
∧ γ1 + γ2 < m (0, ?)
f6(γ) : γ1 + γ2 + γ5 < γ3 + γ4 + γ6
∧ γ3 + γ4 < m (1, ?)
f7(γ) : γ1 + γ2 + γ5 = γ3 + γ4 + γ6 (?, ?)
The index k should be the same in every physical BM, so
a majority voting decides (γ1 + γ2 + γ5 vs. γ3 + γ4 + γ6).
The identification of the second index l can only be suc-
cessful, if no photons are lost. Moreover, we found that
better communication rates will be achieved with the ad-
ditional requirement that all physical BMs in a block
must give the same value of k in order to accept this
block for the identification of l. (For the standard BM
scheme as depicted in Fig. 2, this is always satisfied, since
the index l can only be identified if k = 1. However,
when using advanced BM schemes in a scenario, where
also depolarizing errors are present, the extra require-
ment becomes important. For details see Sec. VI D.) For
some error channels, the standard expressions fu(γ) are
inappropriate, especially when considering on-off detec-
tors, where losses can no longer be identified. We will
give the appropriate expressions in Sec. VI E.
The outcome probabilities Bu,1 corresponding to an
undisturbed |φ0,0〉(m)-state on the block level can now
P
(only loss)
u,v |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉
(1, 0) 0 0 ηt 0
(1, 1) 0 0 0 ηt
(0, ?) ηt ηt 0 0
(?, ?) 1− ηt 1− ηt 1− ηt 1− ηt
TABLE I. Outcome probabilities on the physical level if only
photon loss is present. The matrices P (as well as the matrices
B and L) are defined as 7 × 4 matrix. However, in many
occasions, entire rows have vanishing entries corresponding to
BM outcomes that are inaccessible in the given error model.
These “zero-rows” (in this particular instance the rows 1, 2,
and 6 corresponding to outcomes (0, 0), (0, 1), and (1, ?)) are
not displayed in the tables throughout this work.
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Bu,1 =
1
2m−1
m∑
r=0
r even
∑
α,β∈N70
|α|=m−r
|β|=r
(
m
α, β
)
Pα·,1P
β
·,2 δfu(α+β).
(22)
Here we use the common multi-index notation xα =
xα11 x
α2
2 ... together with the multinomial coefficient(
m
α,β
)
=
(
m
α1,...,α7,β1,...,β7
)
= m!α1!...β7! and define the vectors
P·,v as the column vectors of the matrix Pu,v. The sum
index r gives the number of incoming (physical) |φ0,1〉
states in this block. According to the Bell state repre-
sentation (2) it must be even. The index vectors α and β
describe the number of outcomes and have the same form
as γ. However, they still distinguish between incoming
|φ0,0〉 and |φ0,1〉 states. The BM itself has no access to
this distinction, which is represented by the fact that the
expressions fu depend only on the combined numbers
γ = α + β. The combinatorical expression in Eq. (22)
can be simplified (see Appendix B) to
Bu,1 =
1
2m
∑
γ∈N70
|γ|=m
(
m
γ
)
δfu(γ) (23)
× [(P·,1+P·,2)γ + (P·,1−P·,2)γ ] ,
which has far less restrictions and is easier to compute.
Furthermore, for most error models some of the sum-
mands (Pw,1 + Pw,2) and/or (Pw,1 − Pw,2) can be evalu-
ated to become zero, thus eliminating the corresponding
summation indices γw.
To obtain the outcome probabilities for the other three
block Bell states |φk,l〉(m), only minor changes must be
made in Eqs. (22) and (23). If the second index l is 1
(Bu,2 and Bu,4), the sum index r must be odd instead of
even in Eq. (22). In Eq. (23) this changes the + in the
middle of the square brackets to −. On the other hand,
for k = 1 (Bu,3 and Bu,4), the vectors P·,1 and P·,2 are
replaced by P·,3 and P·,4, respectively.
Let us now return to our example that includes only
transmission loss. Since the matrix P (only loss) has non-
zero entries only in the rows 3,4,5, and 7, we immediately
obtain γ1 = γ2 = γ6 = 0. This tells us that the conditions
f1 and f2 cannot be met. Additionally, for B
(only loss)
u,1 and
B
(only loss)
u,2 only the first and second columns of P
(only loss)
must be considered, where we have γ3 = γ4 = 0. This
yields, for example,
B
(only loss)
7,1 =
1
2m
∑
γ1,γ2
γ1+γ2=m
(
m
γ1, γ2
)
δγ2=0
× [2(1− ηt)]γ1 [2ηt]γ2
= (1− ηt)m. (24)
As expected, this is the probability of losing all m pho-
tons in the block, which is the only case, where no in-
formation can be obtained. Similar calculations give the
other entries of B(only loss), which are displayed in Ta-
ble II
The step from the block level to the logical level is very
similar to the procedure as shown above. Yet, this time
we must use the Bell state representation (3) and choose
a different set of interpretation rules gu(λ), where λ plays
the same role as γ did before:
g1(λ) : λ7 = 0 ∧ λ3 + λ4 + λ6 is even
∧ λ1 + λ3 > λ2 + λ4 (0, 0)
g2(λ) : λ7 = 0 ∧ λ3 + λ4 + λ6 is even
∧ λ1 + λ3 < λ2 + λ4 (0, 1)
g3(λ) : λ7 = 0 ∧ λ3 + λ4 + λ6 is odd
∧ λ1 + λ3 > λ2 + λ4 (1, 0)
g4(λ) : λ7 = 0 ∧ λ3 + λ4 + λ6 is odd
∧ λ1 + λ3 < λ2 + λ4 (1, 1)
g5(λ) : λ7 = 0 ∧ λ3 + λ4 + λ6 is even
∧ λ1 + λ3 = λ2 + λ4 (0, ?)
g6(λ) : λ7 = 0 ∧ λ3 + λ4 + λ6 is odd
∧ λ1 + λ3 = λ2 + λ4 (1, ?)
g7(λ) : λ7 > 0 (?, ?)
In order to identify the first index k we must know it in
every block, thus λ7 = 0. The identification of the second
index l, however, is done via majority voting in this step
(λ1 +λ3 vs. λ2 +λ4). Analogously to Eqs. (22) and (23),
we get the outcome probabilities Lu,1 corresponding to
an undisturbed |φ0,0〉(n,m)-state on the logical level:
Lu,1 =
1
2n−1
n∑
s=0
s even
∑
µ,ν∈N70
|µ|=n−s
|ν|=s
(
n
µ, ν
)
Bµ·,1B
ν
·,3 δgu(µ+ν).
(25)
Here s is the number of incoming |φ1,0〉(m) block states.
Note that, because of the different Bell state representa-
tion, we now have to use the columns 1 and 3 of the
matrix B, whereas before we had to use columns 1 and
2 of matrix P . The same simplification as before (see
Appendix B) yields
Lu,1 =
1
2n
∑
λ∈N70
|λ|=n
(
n
λ
)
δgu(λ) (26)
×
[
(B·,1+B·,3)
λ
+ (B·,1−B·,3)λ
]
.
The required modifications to obtain the outcome
probabilities for the other three Bell states |φk,l〉(n,m) are:
for k = 1 (Lu,3 and Lu,4) the index s in Eq. (25) must be
odd, which turns the + in the square brackets in Eq. (26)
into a −; for l = 1 (Lu,2 and Lu,4) the vectors B·,1 and
B·,3 are replaced by B·,2 and B·,4, respectively.
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(only loss)
u,v |φ0,0〉(m) |φ0,1〉(m) |φ1,0〉(m) |φ1,1〉(m)
(1, 0) 0 0 ηmt 0
(1, 1) 0 0 0 ηmt
(0, ?) 1− (1− ηt)m 1− (1− ηt)m 0 0
(1, ?) 0 0 1− (1− ηt)m − ηmt 1− (1− ηt)m − ηmt
(?, ?) (1− ηt)m (1− ηt)m (1− ηt)m (1− ηt)m
L
(only loss)
u,v |φ0,0〉(n,m) |φ0,1〉(n,m) |φ1,0〉(n,m) |φ1,1〉(n,m)
(0, 0) {[1− (1− ηt)m]n − [1− (1− ηt)m − η
m
t
2
]n − [ ηmt
2
]n}12×2 02×2(0, 1)
(1, 0)
02×2 {[1− (1− ηt)m]n − [1− (1− ηt)m − η
m
t
2
]n + [
ηmt
2
]n}12×2(1, 1)
TABLE II. Outcome probabilities on the block level (top) and on the logical level (bottom) if only photon loss is present.
Of the seven possible BM outcomes on the logical level
only the first four are relevant: those that indicate a suc-
cessful BM. Since there is no additional code on top of
the QPC that could potentially make use of the partial
information of outcomes 5 and 6, we display only the
four relevant matrix rows of L in Table II. The calcu-
lation of the outcome probabilities L
(only loss)
u,v in our ex-
emplary transmission-loss-only scenario can be done in
perfect analogy to that of B
(only loss)
u,v . These results are
also part of Table II.
Note that the resulting 4 × 4 array as shown in Ta-
ble II is diagonal with all diagonal entries non-zero. This
means that whenever one of the four logical Bell states
is obtained as an outcome of the BM, this BM result is
error-free, just as required for an unambiguous BM on
the logical level. As opposed to the BMs on the physi-
cal level, however, all four Bell states can sometimes be
identified. Nonetheless, in a realistic communication sce-
nario, there will be other sources of error beyond loss
and the logical BMs do become faulty. This effect and
its influence on the transmission rates will be discussed
next.
B. Transmission rates
The outcome probabilities Lu,v on the logical level al-
low for an investigation of the performance of the logical
BM. The probability for the BM to identify a Bell state
correctly (assuming equal a priori probabilities) is given
by
Lid =
1
4 (L1,1 + L2,2 + L3,3 + L4,4) , (27)
while the probabilities to induce an unheralded Pauli er-
ror are given by
LX =
1
4 (L3,1 + L4,2 + L1,3 + L2,4) , (28)
LY =
1
4 (L4,1 + L3,2 + L2,3 + L1,4) , (29)
LZ =
1
4 (L2,1 + L1,2 + L4,3 + L3,4) , (30)
respectively. These unheralded Pauli errors are not to
be confused with the heralded “errors” that the results of
the BM induce as part of the teleportation protocol. The
latter can, of course, be corrected, either immediately or
later and altogether in a final step of the communica-
tion protocol (see Sec. II) and so they do not influence
the efficiency of the communication scheme. The former,
however, describe unheralded errors that reduce the ef-
ficiency of the BM and thus that of the communication
scheme.
When analyzing the communication scheme, we are
first interested in the raw transmission rate. This is re-
lated to the probability that all the BMs at the interme-
diate repeater stations herald a successful teleportation.
It is given by
ptrans = (Lid + LX + LY + LZ)
N , (31)
where N = LtotL0 is the number of repeater stations tak-
ing part in the transmission (including the one at the
receiver). This probability only represents the number
of accepted transmissions. It contains no information
whether the transmitted logical qubit has undergone an
unheralded Pauli error. Apart from qubit state fidelities,
a common figure of merit to account for these unher-
alded errors is the secure key rate that can be achieved
when using the communication scheme for quantum key
distribution (QKD). In order to be comparable to other
communication schemes, we choose the secure key rate of
the BB84 protocol [31], which is also the figure of merit
for the communication scheme in Ref. [15]. Since the
BB84 protocol utilizes measurements in the X- and in
the Z-basis, we define the associated quantum bit error
rates (QBERs) as the rate of obtaining an X-flipped (Z-
flipped) result at the receiver divided by the raw trans-
mission rate ptrans. An X-flipped (Z-flipped) result is ob-
tained, when the total number of hidden X and Y errors
(Z and Y errors) occurring in the BMs of the transmis-
sion is odd. We therefore get
QX/Z =
1
ptrans
∑
aid,aX,aY,aZ
aid+aX+aY+aZ=N
(
N
aid, aX, aY, aZ
)
× Laidid LaXX LaYY LaZZ δaX/Z+aY odd
10
=
1
2
[
1− (Lid ∓ LX − LY ± LZ)
N
(Lid + LX + LY + LZ)N
]
. (32)
The secure key rate obtainable by BB84 is then given by
R = 1t0 max [ptrans (1− 2h(Q)) , 0] , (33)
where t0 is the elementary time needed at every repeater
station until the incoming signal qubit has been processed
and a fresh encoded Bell state is ready for teleporting
and error-correcting the next qubit. It corresponds to
the standard time unit in our proposal. The combined
QBER is given by Q = (QX + QZ)/2 and h(Q) is the
binary entropy function
h(Q) = −Q log2(Q)− (1−Q) log2(1−Q). (34)
It should be noted at this point that the given secure key
rates are only lower bounds to the actually achievable
key rates. This is due to the fact that a lot of averaging
happens at several points of the analysis. In a recent work
[16], Namiki et al. showed for a very similar setup (the
one described in Ref. [15]) that by keeping track of all the
information obtained from the BMs on the physical level,
better estimations on the secure key rate are possible [32].
When looking at our transmission-loss-only scenario,
we find that the success probability of the raw transmis-
sion p
(only loss)
trans is given by
p
(only loss)
trans =
{
[1−(1−ηt)m]n−
[
1−(1−ηt)m− η
m
t
2
]n}N
.
(35)
Furthermore, we see that transmission loss alone cannot
induce Pauli errors (LX = LY = LZ = 0) and that, con-
sequently, the quantum bit error rate is Q(only loss) = 0.
Therefore, the secure key rate obtained for this simple er-
ror model is just the raw transmission probability divided
by the elementary time t0, R
(only loss) = 1t0 p
(only loss)
trans (see
the rate analysis of the loss-only scenario in Ref. [prl]:
the qubit transmission rates calculated there are equiva-
lent to secure key rates). A further discussion of this rate
is part of Sec. VI A.
VI. RESULTS
In this section we apply the results of Sec. V to various
error models. We start with the case of only loss that has
been partly discussed already, but here we shall also in-
clude the effect of detector loss. We then focus on Pauli-
type errors, especially the depolarizing error channel, and
on the effect of dark counts in the photon detectors of
the BM. This is followed by a discussion on whether an
improvement of the BM efficiency on the physical level
is worth the additional experimental effort. Finally, the
possibility of using on-off detectors instead of PNRDs will
be explored.
A. Loss only
The case where transmission loss is the only error
source present in our setup has already been described
in Sec. V. However, losses may also occur within the re-
peater stations, especially within the photon detectors.
Lossy detectors with efficiency ηd are usually modeled by
a beam splitter with transmission coefficient ηd in front
of a perfect photon detector with the second input mode
of the beam splitter being vacuum. This model does not
only reproduce the detector efficiency ηd, which is defined
as the probability to detect a single photon when a single
photon enters the detector, but also gives the probabili-
ties for the measurement results when multiple photons
enter the detector, e.g. for two incoming photons, the
probability of detecting exactly two photons is η2d. For
every successful (or partly successful) BM on the physical
level, two photons (of which one stems from the propa-
gating incoming signal and the other one comes from the
local ancilla Bell state) must be detected by the four de-
tectors of the BM. We therefore obtain the probability
that the transmitted photon is not lost on the way and
both photons are detected η = η2d exp(− L0Latt ). This takes
the place of ηt in Sec. V, yielding the secret key rate
R(loss) =
1
t0
{
[1−(1−η)m]n−
[
1−(1−η)m− η
m
2
]n}N
.
(36)
The case where only loss is present (either due to trans-
mission or lossy detectors) is one of the rare cases, for
which we found a compact analytic formula for the se-
cure key rate, i.e. Eq. (36). It can be understood quite
nicely by recalling the correction properties of the QPCs
(see Sec. III): for the loss to be correctable, at least one
intact photon pair must be left in every block and one
block must remain completely intact. The first term in
Eq. (36), [1− (1− η)m]n, is the probability that in every
one of the n blocks less than all m photon pairs are sub-
ject to (either transmission or detector) loss. The second
term,
[
1− (1− η)m − ηm2
]n
, can be best understood by
first ignoring the factor 12 . In that case, it gives the prob-
ability that in every block at least one but not all photon
pairs are left. These terms must be discarded due to the
second condition of at least one intact block. The fac-
tor 12 now corresponds to the BM efficiency at the block
level: of all the blocks where all photon pairs are left,
only half are useful, because the other half gives |φ0l〉(m)
states, where the index l cannot be identified.
Next, we will discuss some properties of the secure key
rate in Eq. (36) as a function of the loss η and hence
as a function of the repeater spacing L0. In the limit of
very small loss (η → 1), corresponding to very good de-
tectors and small repeater spacing, the term in the curly
braces in Eq. (36) goes to 1− 2−n, which is just the suc-
cess probability of the logical BM when no loss occurs.
However, the small repeater spacing L0 in the exponent
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FIG. 3. Left: Total success probability Rt0 vs. re-
peater spacing L0 in km for a communication distance of
Ltot = 1 000 km and various encodings (from bottom to top:
(10,3),(13,4),(16,4),(23,5),(35,6)). Right: Inverse of the cost
function C(1 000 km) as a function of the code parameters
n,m. At every point the optimal repeater spacing L0 is cho-
sen. The most cost efficient code is (23, 5) with a repeater
spacing of L0 ≈ 2.4 km yielding Rt0 = 76.18%.
N = LtotL0 , corresponding to very bad detectors or large
repeater spacing (typically we may assume reasonable ηd
and so this means large repeater spacing), pushes the rate
to zero. On the other hand, for very large loss (η → 0) we
find that the terms in the two square brackets in Eq. (36)
go to zero and hence the secure key rate decays with in-
creasing repeater spacing L0. In between the two extreme
cases of very small and very large repeater spacings (or,
more generally, loss) the secure key rate has a single max-
imum. Even for large total distances Ltot it is possible
to find appropriate values of n, m, and L0 such that high
secure key rates (R(loss)t0 / 1) can be achieved. In most
cases the repeater spacing that, for given Ltot, n and m,
maximizes the secure key rate is in the range of hun-
dreds of meters up to a few kilometers. Some examples
are shown in Fig. 3.
In addition to the search of code parameters that yield
high secure key rates, we are also interested in optimizing
these parameters with respect to the experimental costs
[15]. To do so, in our case, we assume the cost of a setup
to be proportional to the total number of photons used in
the setup. At every repeater station a logical Bell state
has to be supplied, corresponding to a total number of
photons of (2nm)LtotL0 . In order to find an optimal code
for a given distance that the communication scheme shall
cover we therefore use the cost function
C =
nm
RL0
. (37)
For example, for a total distance of 1 000 km and perfect
detectors (ηd = 1) the inverse 1/C, which corresponds to
the repeater rate per photons used, is shown in Fig. 3. We
find that (n,m) = (23, 5) and L0 = 2.4 km are most cost
efficient and give a secure key rate R(loss) = 0.76t−10 . In a
more demanding scenario of a total distance of 10 000 km
and ηd = 0.97 the optimal choices (n,m) = (50, 7) and
L0 = 1.6 km yield R
(loss) = 0.77t−10 . As a general trend
we see that the number of blocks n should be chosen
significantly larger than the block size m. Additionally,
we found that both lossier detectors and larger total dis-
tances require not only the use of larger codes, but also
a reduced repeater spacing.
It should be kept in mind that this cost analysis re-
lies on the assumption that the cost of generating the
ancillary QPC(n,m) Bell states is linear in the number
of photons in the final state. In Appendix C we present
a scheme to generate the required QPC-Bell states with
the help of coherent photon conversion, a nonlinear tech-
nique first presented in Ref. [30] which exactly achieves
this linear scaling. However, it is also possible to re-
strict state generation to the methods of linear optics.
In this case a large overhead of single photon sources
and the use of feedforward operations is necessary for
the so-called multiplexing. In Appendix D we give an
extensive description of this linear optical state gener-
ation (see also Refs. [12, 13, 33]) and also show that
the resource cost in this case scales approximately as
(nm)log2(8/3) ≈ (nm)1.415. This scaling is, of course,
worse than the linear one achieved by the coherent-
photon-conversion-based state generation scheme and it
will change what code sizes are most cost efficient. In gen-
eral, a scaling larger than linear will yield smaller QPC
sizes as an optimal choice. Here and in the following we
restrict the discussion of the optimal code sizes for the
various error models to the linearly scaling cost function.
When comparing our scheme to other recent quantum
communication schemes it is important to also take the
elementary time t0 into consideration. Since our logical
Bell states are assumed to be available on demand, t0
corresponds only to the duration of the linear-optics pro-
cessing with photon detection. Compared to those times
required in a matter-based scheme with t0 ∼ 1µs (even
assuming future enhanced ion-cavity coupling strengths
[15]) or an all-optical scheme including feedforward [12]
with t0 ∼ 10ns (provided all circuits can be integrated
[34]), corresponding to rates R ∼ MHz or R ∼ 0.1 GHz,
respectively, our static linear optical scheme allows, in
principle, for GHz−rates and beyond [35].
B. Depolarizing Errors
Another type of errors that is frequently observed
in optical experiments is the class of photon-number-
preserving errors. In the case of dual-rail encoding on
the physical qubits (polarization encoding is a form of
dual-rail encoding), these photon-number-preserving er-
rors can be represented in terms of Pauli errors. We
P
(depol)
u,v |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉
(1, 0) 
2
η 
2
η
(
1− 3
2
)
η 
2
η
(1, 1) 
2
η 
2
η 
2
η
(
1− 3
2
)
η
(0, ?) (1− ) η (1− ) η η η
(?, ?) 1− η 1− η 1− η 1− η
TABLE III. Outcome probabilities on the physical level if
photon loss and depolarizing errors are present.
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FIG. 4. Influence of depolarizing errors on the secure key rate
(Ltot = 1 000 km and rates as Rt0 in both plots) – Left: Secure
key rate of QPC(23,5) (which is optimal in terms of cost for
 = 0) as a function of the repeater spacing. From top to
bottom:  = 0, 10−4, 10−3, 5 · 10−3. Right: Raw transmission
rate (orange, top), secure key rate (blue, mid) and QBER
(green, bottom) of QPC(23,5) for  = 5 ·10−3. For very small
repeater spacings the QBER exceeds 11% and thus the secure
key rate vanishes. This is an extreme case, since (23, 5) is not
the optimal parameter choice anymore. For the optimal (i.e.,
most cost efficient) code (28,6) the QBER is much smaller and
therefore the difference between raw transmission rate and
secure key rate is smaller as well. In any case, the main effect
of the depolarizing error is a reduction of the raw transmission
rate.
therefore investigate the influence that Pauli errors on
the physical level have on the transmission and secure
key rates. As a prototype of Pauli-type errors, we choose
the depolarizing error channel
ρ→ (1− 2)ρ+ 
2
3∑
i=0
σiρσi, (38)
where σi are the four Pauli operators {1, X, Y, Z}. Since
the four Pauli operators are weighted equally, the depo-
larizing error channel is the most generic Pauli-type error
channel and gives a quantum error correction code the
broadest challenge. The outcome probabilities P
(depol)
u,v
on the physical level are given in Table III. Of course, the
transmission loss due to fiber attenuation is also present,
and as in Sec. VI A lossy detectors can be incorporated
by choosing η accordingly. To calculate the outcome
probabilities on the higher encoding levels [B
(depol)
u,v and
L
(depol)
u,v ] we again use the index restrictions fu(γ) and
gu(λ) given in Sec. V A.
Unfortunately, both the transmission rate and the se-
cure key rate cannot be represented in a compact ana-
lytic form like in Eq. (36). Nevertheless, various con-
clusions can be drawn from the numerical results. As
expected, Pauli errors on the physical level can lead to
logical Pauli errors. The QBER no longer vanishes in
this case and therefore the secure key rate is lower than
the raw transmission rate. Although there are parameter
ranges, where the QBER is above 11%, which is the point
where the secure key rate drops to zero, in most cases the
main effect of the depolarizing errors is a decrease in the
raw transmission rate (see Fig. 4).
In general, errors below  = 10−4 hardly have an effect
on the secure key rate. Errors of the order of  ≈ 10−3
reduce the secure key rates, but the optimal code param-
eters (n, m, L0) are almost identical to those for  = 0.
When considering even larger errors ( ≈ 10−2) the op-
timal code size grows and the repeater spacing has to
be reduced. For example, Ltot = 1 000 km, ηd = 1 and
 = 10−2 lead to optimal (i.e., most cost efficient) code
parameters (n,m) = (50, 8) and L0 = 2.0 km and a secure
key rate R(depol) = 0.69t−10 . It appears to be a common
theme that the secure key rate at the optimal parame-
ter choices becomes R ≈ 0.7t−10 , even though rates much
closer to one are possible with smaller repeater spacings
(resulting in higher costs).
C. Dark Counts
In Sec. VI A we already discussed that photon detec-
tors usually have a limited efficiency and do not detect
every photon that enters. This is modeled by a beam
splitter with transmission coefficient ηd in front of a per-
fect detector. Another error that often occurs in photon
detectors is a dark count. Usually a dark count is defined
as a click of the detector, when no photon was present.
However, when considering photon-number-resolving de-
tectors, the situation becomes more complicated, because
it is then generally possible to detect more photons than
those that were actually present. To model a detector
with dark counts we extend the idea for the lossy detec-
tor. Again, a beam splitter with transmission coefficient
ηd is put in front of a perfect detector, but instead of
leaving the second input mode of the beam splitter empty
(i.e., using vacuum), we use a thermal state
ρth(n¯) =
∞∑
j=0
n¯j
(n¯+ 1)j+1
|j〉 〈j| , (39)
where n¯ is the average photon number of the state.
This model can be used to derive the probability p
(dc)
µ→ν
of detecting ν photons, when µ photons entered the de-
tector. The calculation of these probabilities is rather
lengthy and can be found in Appendix E. Usually the
dark count probability is defined as the probability to
detect at least one photon, although no photon entered
the detector. In this model, it is given by
pdc = 1− p(dc)0→0 =
n¯(1− ηd)
1 + n¯(1− ηd) ≈ n¯(1− ηd), (40)
where the approximation holds for high efficiency detec-
tors and small average photon numbers.
Of course, only a small set of the probabilities p
(dc)
µ→ν
is actually needed for our purposes. First, since there is
no other source of additional photons in our communica-
tion scheme, the number of photons entering a detector
is limited to a maximum of two. Second, the detectors
are not required to resolve the photon number for more
than two photons: if a detector recognizes more than two
photons and the other detectors of the physical BM find
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none, it is most likely that the incoming state was a |φ0l〉
state [recall that in the ideal case these states lead to the
click pattern (2,0,0,0) or permutations thereof]. On the
other hand, if more than one detector recognizes multiple
photons, the BM should be regarded as a failure. Effec-
tively, the detectors must only be able to distinguish the
cases 0, 1, and ≥ 2 photons.
With the help of the probabilities p
(dc)
µ→ν it is possible
to derive the outcome probabilities P
(dc)
u,v for the physical
BMs. It should be kept in mind that in addition to the
detector inefficiencies, the transmission loss is also still
present. It is, for example, possible to lose a photon dur-
ing the transmission, but still detect two photons in the
corresponding physical-level BM, because a dark count
occurred. Whether the state is identified correctly or not
in this case depends on which detector was affected.
When analyzing the outcome probabilities P
(dc)
u,v , we
find that in the leading order (with respect to the aver-
age photon number n¯) the probability of identifying an
incoming |φ0,0〉-state as a |φ1,0〉-state is given by
(dc) = p−1n¯(1− ηd), (41)
which is just the product of the probabilities of losing
exactly one of the two original photons (either during
transmission or within the detector) p−1 = (1 − ηt)ηd +
ηt2(1− ηd)ηd, having a photon in the thermal state (ap-
proximately n¯ for small average photon numbers), and
reflecting that photon at the beam splitter in front of the
detector (1 − ηd). As we have seen in Eq. (40) the term
n¯(1− ηd) corresponds to the probability of a dark count.
When looking at the other false identifications, we always
find the same probability (dc) (in the leading order), see
Table VIII in Appendix E. Therefore, the effect of the
dark counts bears some resemblance to a depolarizing er-
ror channel with  = 2(dc). However, it is also possible
that a dark count occurs in a detector that clearly signals
a failure, e.g. when there is a single click in both horizon-
tal detectors (see section IV). This occurs with the same
probability (dc) and does not have a counterpart in the
depolarizing error channel. Consequently, the leading-
order terms of the correct identifications as well do not
fit into the depolarizing error channel interpretation. Ad-
ditionally, dark counts can, of course, also occur without
prior loss of another photon. Although click patterns
with a total of three clicks can contain information on
the original Bell state, we have decided to interpret these
events as failures of the physical-level BM. For details on
the interpretation of click patterns see Appendix E. To
summarize, the effect of the dark counts is more complex
than just introducing depolarizing errors. Nevertheless,
the numerical analysis shows that the QPC-based BM
is also robust against the effects of dark-count-afflicted
detectors, as long as (dc) is small enough and the de-
tector inefficiency 1 − ηd is not too big. For example,
for ηd = 0.97 and n¯ = 0.03 the optimal parameters
(n,m) = (38, 6) and L0 = 1.9 km yield a repeater rate
of R(dc) = 0.69t−10 and correspond to 
(dc) ≈ 0.7 · 10−4.
In this parameter range the comparison to a transmis-
sion with depolarizing errors with  = 1.4 · 10−4, no dark
counts but detector losses of ηd = 0.97 is rather adequate
as we obtain the optimal parameters (n,m) = (37, 6) and
L0 = 2.1 km yielding R
(depol) = 0.70t−10 .
D. Advanced BM Schemes
After considering the main error types that occur dur-
ing the communication scheme (photon loss due to chan-
nel transmission and operational errors such as Pauli-
type errors and detector inefficiencies), we now concen-
trate on the actual BM scheme. Compared to other
communication schemes, especially that in Ref. [15], our
scheme requires more photons to encode a single qubit.
This is mainly due to the limitation of the physical BM
to an efficiency of 12 . It is therefore sensible to ask
whether more advanced optical BM schemes on the phys-
ical level could improve the performance of our commu-
nication scheme. Particularly, more effective BMs which,
of course, come with a higher experimental cost, could
reduce the required size of the QPCs for faithful long-
distance communication.
In recent years, various suggestions have been made to
realize a static, all-optical BM that can beat the well-
known notorious 12 -limit of Ref. [21]. All these schemes
use additional resources to achieve higher efficiencies,
namely either squeezing [28] or additional photons that
can be entangled [27] or not [29]. A common property
of these schemes, which is also a necessary condition to
be useful for their use in the QPC-based BM, is that the
unambiguous identification of the states |φ1,l〉 is always
successful when no errors occurred. At the ame time the
probability of correctly identifying the states |φ0,l〉 is in-
creased. Additionally, this increase is independent of l
for most schemes [27, 29], which simplifies the further
analysis.
Since there is no need to restrict our analysis to a
particular one of the above-mentioned advanced BM
schemes, we introduce a parameter padv, which is the
probability to correctly identify the states |φ0,l〉. For
the standard linear optics Bell measurement we have
padv = 0, whereas for an ideal BM we have padv = 1. The
P
(adv)
u,v |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉
(0, 0) padvηt 0 0 0
(0, 1) 0 padvηt 0 0
(1, 0) 0 0 ηt 0
(1, 1) 0 0 0 ηt
(0, ?) (1− padv) ηt (1− padv) ηt 0 0
(?, ?) 1− ηt 1− ηt 1− ηt 1− ηt
TABLE IV. Outcome probabilities on the physical level if an
advanced BM scheme is used that has a probability of padv to
correctly identify the states |φ0,l〉. Additionally, transmission
loss is considered.
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FIG. 5. Cost function C (left) and optimal code size n · m
(right) as a function of the probability padv to correctly iden-
tify a |φ0,l〉-state. From bottom to top the total communica-
tion distance is Ltot = 100 km, 1 000 km and 10 000 km. The
absolute values of the cost function C should not be compared
between the variuos communication distances, because for an
actual comparison a factor L has to be multiplied. However,
when doing so, the shape of the the cost function becomes
unrecognizable for the smaller L in this representation. In-
dependent of L the optimal code remains the same for small
values of padv. At padv ≈ 0.5 the size of the optimal code
starts to drop and so does the cost. The large drop in the
code size, which also marks the start of the decrease of the
cost function occurs, when the more efficient BM allows to
reduce the block size m.
total efficiency of the BM is given by pBM =
1
2 (1 + padv).
The outcome probabilities P
(adv)
u,v are given in Table IV.
Here we consider transmission loss, but lossy detectors
are not taken into account since, depending on the corre-
sponding advanced scheme, a varying number of photons
are detected. The same obviously holds for dark counts.
Table IV does also not consider depolarizing errors, but
including these is very straightforward.
Applying the error propagation analysis presented in
Sec. V to P
(adv)
u,v as depicted in Table IV with the usual
propagation rules fu(γ) and gu(λ) yields the following
secure key rate:
R(adv) =
1
t0
{
[1− (1− ηt)m]n (42)
−
[
1− (1− ηt)m − (1 + p
m
adv)η
m
t
2
]n}N
.
This is very similar to the secure key rate of Eq. (36). The
only difference (besides ηd ≡ 1) is the factor (1 +pmadv) in
the last summand. From this term alone we already see
that the impact of an increased physical BM efficiency
will be rather small unless we have a very good BM with
padv close to one, because the term (1+p
m
adv) grows rather
slow for smaller values of padv.
When considering depolarizing errors in a setting with
advanced BM schemes it is now possible that all physical
BMs of a block herald success, i.e. no photon of the block
was lost and every BM gives an unambiguous result, but
the physical BMs give differing results for the index k.
As already mentioned in the discussion of the error prop-
agation rules fu(γ) in Sec. V A, better communication
rates are obtained when the result for the index l that
such a block gives is disregarded. This is due to the fact
that differing values in k herald a bit-flip in at least one
of the physical qubits. This bit-flip can either be an X-
or a Y -error, which are equally probable in the depolar-
izing error channel. However, the Y -error also includes a
phase-flip, which changes the result for l. Therefore, in
a block where the index k is not measured unanimously
in the physical BMs, the resulting value for l is known to
be completely random.
Fig. 5 shows the optimized cost function C [see
Eq. (37)] and the optimal code size n ·m as a function of
the BM parameter padv for various communication dis-
tances Ltot. Since the advanced BM scheme has to be
applied to every pair of physical qubits, it is reasonable
to assume the additional cost to be proportional to the
total number of photons used (nmLtot/L0). This is the
same coefficient that is used in the cost function C. The
difference in C for varying values of padv therefore in-
dicates the allowed overhead cost to achieve the higher
BM efficiency. We found that the shape of the graph
C(padv) is almost independent of the communication dis-
tance Ltot. Especially, the fraction
C(padv=0)
C(padv=1)
is almost
constant at a value of about 3. For the advanced BM
schemes based only on linear optics [27, 29], the exper-
imental requirements of a single BM grow very quickly
when approaching BM efficiencies close to 1. Thus, it ap-
pears that utilizing them to reduce the code size is not the
most resource effective method. Most notably, even the
use of nonlinearites to achieve unit BM efficiency should
be questioned (again under the assumption of a linear
scaling for the cost of generating QPC encoded states).
In other words, our linear-optics communication scheme
based on standard linear-optics BMs is almost as good,
producing almost as good rates at almost the same cost,
as those schemes based on local CNOT operations and
light-matter interactions such as that of Ref. [15].
Nonetheless, the result that the use of more advanced
optical BM schemes, such as the 34 -efficiency scheme of
Ref. [29], increases the cost effectiveness of our communi-
cation scheme only marginally, is rather surprising, since
for the all-optical communication scheme presented by
Azuma et al. in Ref. [12], the more detailed analysis per-
formed in Ref. [13] showed that an increase of the BM
efficiency to 34 (both for the linear-optics state prepara-
tion and for the online repeater operations) allows for
a substantial reduction of the required resources. This
highlights that the quantum parity code used in our com-
munication scheme is very well adapted to the limited
capability of the standard linear optical BM. However,
when our state preparations are also restricted to linear
optics [12, 13, 33], an improved physical BM on dual-rail
qubits does significantly reduce the cost of resources (in
terms of single-photon sources) also in our case as well
(see Appendix D).
E. On-Off Detectors
We have seen above that the relatively cheap standard
optical BM yields good transmission rates at costs com-
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parable to those of schemes using matter qubits for pro-
cessing. Now we even go one step further and eliminate
the last experimentally expensive component from our
BM – the photon-number-resolving detectors that can
resolve 0, 1, and ≥ 2 photons – and replace them by sim-
ple on-off detectors. As was already stated, the PNRDs
are required to distinguish a |φ0,l〉-state from any Bell
state that has lost a photon. At first, it seems that this
excludes the possibility to use on-off detectors for a loss
resistant QPC-based BM, but we found that with ap-
propriate changes to the interpretation rules fu(γ) the
QPC-based BM can still be used for our communication
scheme without increasing the required cost too much.
When |φ0,l〉-states can no longer be distinguished from
loss, rows 5 and 7 in Pu,v have to be joined. The resulting
matrix P
(on-off)
u,v is shown in Table V for the case that both
transmission loss and depolarizing errors are present. To
be precise, Table V is correct only for perfect photon de-
tectors (ηd = 1). In any other case, the usual choice
η = η2dηt introduces a small error, since the on-off detec-
tors are still able to detect whether both photons have
been lost. These cases, however, have only a marginal ef-
fect, since they change the result of the logical BM only,
if in one block all 2m photons are lost. This is extremely
unlikely and, in fact, we found that the corresponding
change of the secure key rate is below the numerical pre-
cision in almost every case. Therefore, we neglect this
subtlety in our presentation here. (It has been taken into
account in the actual calculations though.)
To obtain the outcome probabilities on the block level
B
(on-off)
u,v a new set of interpretation rules f˜u(γ) is re-
quired. Since a distinction between k = 0 and k = ?
on the physical level is no longer possible, the majority
voting (γ1 + γ2 + γ5 vs. γ3 + γ4 + γ6) in the standard
form of fu(γ) is not appropriate here. This can be seen
very clearly in the case, where there are no depolarizing
errors ( = 0). In case of a |φ0,l〉(m) block state, which
consists only of |φ0,ri〉 states on the physical level, the
BM will always give m results (0, ?). Therefore, even a
single k = 1 result indicates that the incoming state must
have been a |φ1,l〉(m) block state. However, the standard
interpretation rules fu(γ) demand more than m/2 results
k = 1 on the physical level for the state to be identified
as a |φ1,l〉(m) state. In this case of  = 0 the appropriate
interpretation rules are therefore:
f˜3(γ) : γ3 + γ4 = m ∧ γ4 is even (1, 0)
f˜4(γ) : γ3 + γ4 = m ∧ γ4 is odd (1, 1)
f˜5(γ) : γ3 + γ4 = 0 (0, ?)
f˜6(γ) : 0 < γ3 + γ4 < m (1, ?)
For u ∈ {1, 2, 7} no acceptable combinations of measure-
ment results on the physical level exist. For the further
computation of L
(on-off)
u,v no changes to the interpretation
rules gu(λ) are required. Following the error propagation
formalism presented in Sec. V we find the raw transmis-
sion rate
p
(on-off)
trans =
[
1−
(
1− η
m
2
)n]N
. (43)
This rate is higher than that obtained with PNRDs, be-
cause the check whether at least one photon is left in ev-
ery block is no longer possible and only those events are
filtered out where no block allowed for an identification
of the index l. This increased transmission rate comes, of
course, at the cost that the lack of loss-detection can lead
to undetected Pauli-errors. In fact, we found that logical
bit-flips (X) are induced, whereas logical phase-flips (Z
and consequently Y ) are still impossible. The QBER for
the induced bit-flips is then given by
Q
(on-off)
X =
1
2
[
1− p
(only loss)
trans
p
(on-off)
trans
]
. (44)
At first glance, the appearance of p
(only loss)
trans here, i.e. the
transmission rate associated with the use of PNRDs, is
surprising, however, it can be understood quite nicely.
The QBER QX is defined as the fraction of the probabil-
ity for successful transmission with a hidden bit-flip and
the probability for any successful transmission. When us-
ing on-off detectors, the latter is given by p
(on-off)
trans . The
remaining numerator in Eq. (44) (p
(on-off)
trans −p(only loss)trans ) is
the probability that a state enters the BM that would be
filtered out as a failure by the PNRDs, but is accepted
when using on-off detectors (because every input state
that PNRDs accept will also be accepted by on-off detec-
tors). These are exactly those states, where in at least
one block all photons were lost. In that case the on-off-
detector-based BM will always assign the block the value
k = 0. Thus, in half of all cases it induces a logical bit-flip
error.
Numerical results show that the resulting secure key
rate R(on-off) is, as expected, smaller than that associ-
ated with the use of PNRDs. However, the difference
is rather small. When optimizing the code parameters
with the help of the cost function C and assuming that
only transmission loss is present, i.e. perfect detectors
with ηd = 1, we even found that the required code size
is reduced. Since the reduced code size comes along with
a reduced repeater spacing, the total cost is neverthe-
less slightly higher. When also including lossy detectors
(ηd < 1) the advantage in terms of a code size reduc-
tion for the on-off detectors is lost, and the codes must
P
(on-off)
u,v |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉
(1, 0) 
2
η 
2
η
(
1− 3
2
)
η 
2
η
(1, 1) 
2
η 
2
η 
2
η
(
1− 3
2
)
η
(0, ?) 1− η 1− η 1− (1− )η 1− (1− )η
TABLE V. Outcome probabilities on the physical level if on-
off detectors are used and depolarizing errors are present in
addition to the inevitable photon loss.
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be chosen larger. However, the secure key rate and the
cost C are still comparable to the case of PNRDs. To be
more precise, the cost C is increased by about 25% (see
Table VI).
Let us now turn to the case, where also depolarizing er-
rors are present. Here the interpretation rules fu(γ) have
to be changed again: If, for example, the physical BMs
of a block give one result (1, 0) and m − 1 results (0, ?),
two scenarios are possible: Either the original block state
was a |φ0,l〉(m) state and in one of the photons a bit-flip
occurred or the original state was |φ1,l〉(m) and m − 1
photons where lost (of course, other scenarios including
multiple bit-flips are also possible, but far less probable).
The BM should identify the incoming state according to
the most probable scenario. Which one this is depends
on the parameters of the setting (m, ηd, L0, ). We pro-
pose to enforce this decision by introducing a boundary
parameter κ. It is associated to the number of k = 1
results in the block. If more (less) than κ physical BMs
in the block give k = 1 the block BM gives (k, l) = (1, ?)
[(k, l) = (0, ?)]. If exactly κ results with k = 1 are ob-
tained, the block (and therefore the entire logical state)
is marked as ambiguous (we refer to these events as tie).
As already stated in Sec. VI D, the blocks with a non-
unanimous voting for k should not be considered for iden-
tifying l. The new interpretation rules are now given as:
f¯3(γ) : γ3 + γ4 = m ∧ γ4 is even (1, 0)
f¯4(γ) : γ3 + γ4 = m ∧ γ4 is odd (1, 1)
f¯5(γ) : γ3 + γ4 < κ (0, ?)
f¯6(γ) : κ < γ3 + γ4 < m (1, ?)
f¯7(γ) : γ3 + γ4 = κ (?, ?)
Again, no acceptable combinations of measurement re-
sults on the physical level exist for u ∈ {1, 2} and the
interpretation rules for the final step from block to logi-
cal level gu(λ) remain unchanged.
 ηd det. type κ (n,m) L0[km] Rt0 C[a.u.]
0 1 PNRD (23, 5) 2.4 0.76 62.9
0 1 on-off (21, 5) 1.9 0.72 76.3
0 0.97 PNRD (37, 6) 2.1 0.73 144.6
0 0.97 on-off (45, 7) 2, 1 0.78 193.5
10−3 1 PNRD (22, 5) 2.0 0.65 84.0
10−3 1 on-off 2 (30, 8) 1.9 0.63 199.4
10−3 1 on-off* 3 (26, 8) 1.4 0.76 194.7
10−3 0.97 PNRD (36, 6) 1.8 0.60 198.8
10−3 0.97 on-off 3 (67, 11) 1.3 0.77 735.4
10−3 0.97 on-off* 3 (58, 10) 1.3 0.71 631.3
TABLE VI. Optimal codes and their rates and cost when com-
bining different error sources (depolarizing errors and detector
loss) and different detector types and interpretation schemes.
The on-off schemes marked with a star accept basically all
input states, as there are no ties in the majority voting for
k on each block. The parameter κ is an additional decision
parameter explained in the text.
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FIG. 6. The interpretation rule determines the secure key
rate of a repeater when using on-off detectors.
Left: Secure key rate and raw transmission rate (dashed) of
QPC(30, 8) for Ltot = 1 000 km,  = 10
−3, ηd = 1, and various
choices of κ: blue (bottom): κ = 1, orange (right): κ = 2,
green (mid): κ = 3, red (left): κ = 4.
Right: The same experimental parameters Ltot, , ηd and the
same code (30,8) as Left, but the alternative interpretation
rule is applied, where all combinations of physical BM results
are accepted for the block level (marked with a * in Table VI).
The raw transmission rate (dashed) becomes independent of
κ and is significantly larger, but also a large QBER is induced
[see especially the case of κ = 2 (orange)].
As before, the inclusion of depolarizing errors into the
setup makes it impossible to give a compact analytic
form for the raw transmission rate or the secure key
rate. However, our numerical results suggest that with
the above interpretation rules and appropriate code pa-
rameter choices, faithful and efficient transmission is still
possible, although at an increased cost. Especially the
combination of depolarizing errors and detector losses
requires much larger codes compared to the case with
PNRDs (see table VI).
It should be noted that the secure key rate depends
strongly on the choice of κ (see Fig. 6). In fact, in some
cases it is even better to slightly change the above in-
terpretation rules: Instead of discarding those cases with
exactly κ results of k = 1, these can also be incorporated
into one of the two acceptance sets, e.g. by assigning to
them the result (k, l) = (1, ?) (this interpretation rule is
marked with a star in Table VI). Depending on the situ-
ation this may yield considerably higher secure key rates
and/or lower costs. However, this comes at the price
of inducing a high QBERe. By accepting all blocks the
raw transmission rate is increased, but this also induces a
higher rate of bit-flip errors. Especially, if the gain in the
secure key rate is comparatively small, we would rather
not include a lot of events with (hidden) bit-flips into the
set of accepted transmissions. Fortunately, the decision
as to whether to include the tie events or not, as well as
the choice of κ, have no influence on the actual optical
setup, but are merely a software adjustment that can be
performed at any time. Furthermore, the communica-
tion scheme does herald results, but does not react to it.
Thus, all possible choices of κ can be investigated in the
same attempt.
As a further note, it is also possible to include dark
counts into the analysis of on-off detectors. The model
presented in Sec. VI C remains the same. However, due
17
to the fact that dark counts can induce click combina-
tions in the physical BM that are identified as an error
with certainty, e.g. clicks in both vertical detectors, the
introduction of a voting parameter κ becomes more com-
plicated, since now three possible outcome classes must
be taken into account. We therefore refrain from a de-
tailed description, especially, since no unexpected inter-
action between the two error sources occurs. Basically,
to suppress both errors, the code size has to be increased
further, just as it was the case for each error source alone.
To summarize this section, the use of on-off detectors
instead of PNRDs introduces a number of subtleties, es-
pecially regarding the interpretation of the physical BM
results. Nevertheless, these complications can be handled
and it is possible to replace PNRDs and still obtain high
secure key rates with codes of a larger but still similar
size to before and therefore comparable resource costs.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In the previous sections we have analyzed a static
linear-optics BM on the quantum parity codes with re-
gards to various error sources. We found that the en-
coded BM does not only have an efficiency extremely
close to one but is also resistant against the inevitable
photon loss occurring in any optical communication
scheme. Furthermore, we have seen that communication
distances of thousands of kilometers can also be reached
when detector losses (1 − ηd) in the range of a few per-
cent in every detector and depolarizing errors  . 10−2
on all single-photon qubits are present. Investigating the
effect of dark counts in the detectors showed that they in-
duce errors similar to depolarizing errors of the strength
 ≈ 2(1 − ηt)n¯(1 − ηd), but can also lead to ambiguous
click patterns that reduce the secure key rate. Neverthe-
less, by adjusting the code size (n,m) and the repeater
spacing L0 accordingly, faithful communication is still
possible, as long as the dark count probability n¯(1− ηd)
does not grow too big.
As a clear indicator that our communication scheme
does indeed yield advantages over the direct communica-
tion of quantum states without any repeater structure we
have compared the secure key rate per modes used Rt02nm
with the TGW bound (Takeoka Guha Wilde, [25]) and its
refinement, the PLOB bound (Pirandola Laurenza Otta-
viani Banchi, [26]), in Fig. 7. There it becomes obvious
that our communication scheme can comfortably beat
these bounds provided the code size is chosen accordingly.
In Fig. 7 we have chosen a constant repeater spacing of
L0 = 1.5 km and a demanding scenario of detector losses
1 − ηd = 3%, depolarizing errors of  = 5 · 10−3, and
dark counts with an average photon number of n¯ = 0.1
in the thermal state (see Sec. VI C) which leads to a
depolarizing-type error of 2(dc) = 5.2 · 10−4. The codes
have been chosen by fixing the block size m and opti-
mizing the number of blocks n with respect to the max-
imal total communication distance which is marked by
500 1000 1500
Ltot
-14-12
-10-8
-6-4
-20
Log10( Rt02nm )
FIG. 7. Depending on the code size, the all-optical QPC-
based communication scheme can easily beat the TGW bound
(dark blue) and the PLOB bound (dark red). Shown is the
secure key rate per number of modes used Rt0
2nm
for L0 =
1.5 km,  = 5 ·10−3, ηd = 0.97, 2(dc) = 5.2 ·10−4, and various
code sizes: blue: (10, 3), orange: (18, 4), green: (31, 5), red:
(45, 6) (from left to right). The codes were chosen by fixing m
and then optimizing n such that the highest communication
distance could be reached.
the sharp drop. If, on the other hand, we keep the ex-
perimental parameters L0, ηd, , and n¯ fixed and optimize
the code size with the help of the cost function C while
also fixing the total communication distance at 1 000 km,
we obtain the code QPC(71,8). In the style of Fig. 7 this
code has its drop at about 4 000 km. This indicates that
the maximally achievable distance with a given code is
much higher than the one where it is chosen as the most
cost efficient one. We note that in an idealized repeater
scenario where no errors are present besides those orig-
inating from channel losses, a QPC as small as (23, 5)
represents the most cost-efficient choice for a total com-
munication distance of Ltot = 1 000 km. We also found
that the smallest code that can beat the TGW bound
in the idealized setting of only transmission loss is actu-
ally much smaller: QPC(6,2) suffices to beat the TGW
bound with our all-optical scheme. This can even be fur-
ther reduced to QPC(4,2) when using the advanced BM
scheme of Ref. [29] for the physical BMs in the repeater
stations. Thus, in order to beat the benchmarks of re-
peaterless quantum communication, encoded states are
needed in our scheme which are clearly in sight of exper-
imental realizations.
In addition to the effect of the error types described
above, we have investigated the effect of using differ-
ent BM schemes on the single-photon level. When re-
placing the standard linear-optics BM on polarization
qubits which is limited to an efficiency of 12 by more
advanced schemes, it was shown that in terms of cost
effectiveness only BMs with an efficiency very close to
one yield a considerable advantage. The optical schemes
presented in [28, 29] that yield efficiencies of about 75%
only have a marginal effect on the repeater rates and the
resource consumption. When comparing the all-optical
communication scheme using the standard BM on the
single-photon level to one using deterministic BMs, e.g.
that of Ref. [15] which uses atomic processing qubits, we
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found that, as long as the deterministic BM has more
than thrice the experimental cost of the standard BM,
our scheme is more resource efficient. From these ob-
servations we conclude that the quantum parity code is
extremely well adapted to the experimental restrictions
of static linear optics. This is further bolstered by the
fact that the all-optical (and static) BM allows for much
smaller processing times at every repeater station and
thus for a higher repetition rate than atomic-based pro-
tocols.
Besides improving the cost effectiveness of our scheme
with the use of more efficient but also more complex BM
schemes, we also investigated the possibility of a fur-
ther experimental simplification, namely replacing the
photon-number-resolving detectors by on-off detectors.
We found that, although this approach introduces a va-
riety of subtle challenges, especially regarding the inter-
pretation of BM results, the use of on-off detectors is
definitely possible. While in the presence of multiple
large operational errors (depolarizing errors and detec-
tor losses) the code size must be increased quite a bit,
and the practicability of on-off detectors is questionable
in this regime, in the case of smaller but not necessar-
ily vanishing errors, the difference in both code size and
repeater spacing between PNRDs and on-off detectors is
quite small. Therefore, on-off detectors should provide
a much easier-to-implement, but similarly effective alter-
native to PNRDs in this regime.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a high-efficiency, loss-and-error-
resistant linear-optics Bell measurement on the quantum
parity codes together with its application to quantum
communication in the form of a static linear-optical one-
way communication scheme reaching transmission rates
in the GHz-regime over thousands of kilometers. In irder
to analyze both the Bell measurement efficiency and the
secure key rate of the communication scheme, we estab-
lished a general toolbox that traces the effect of errors
on the single-photon level through the different encod-
ing levels of the quantum parity code to determine the
induced error rates on the highest encoding level, i.e.
on the logical qubits. With the help of this toolbox
we demonstrated the resistance of our communication
scheme to transmission loss, Pauli-type errors, and de-
tector inefficiencies, i.e. lossy detectors and dark counts.
Furthermore, we showed that the standard linear-optical
Bell measurement with its limited efficiency of one half is
perfectly sufficient for ultrafast fault-tolerant long-range
quantum communication and that the code size reduc-
tion obtained by using more advanced Bell measurement
schemes is most probably not worth the additional ex-
perimental effort if state preparations are excluded. In
fact, it is even possible to further reduce experimental
demands by replacing photon-number-resolving detectors
by much simpler on-off detectors. With no need for mat-
ter qubits (neither as quantum memories nor as local
quantum processors) or feedforward operations, our com-
munication scheme is most suitable to be integrated along
an optical fiber channel via chips that contain quantum
sources [36–38], interferometers [39], and photon detec-
tors [40].
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Appendix A: Bell State Representations
Here we derive our representation of all encoded Bell states in terms of lower-encoding-level Bell states (Eqs. (2)
and (3) in the main text),
|φk,l〉(m) ∼= 1√
2m−1
∑
~r∈Al,m
m⊗
i=1
|φk,ri〉 , (A1)
|φk,l〉(n,m) ∼= 1√
2n−1
∑
~s∈Ak,n
n⊗
i=1
|φsi,l〉(m) , (A2)
with Al,m = { ~r ∈ {0, 1}m |
∑m
i=1 ri = l (mod 2) }.
Remember that QPC(n,m) is constructed by |0〉(m) = |0〉⊗m (|1〉(m) = |1〉⊗m) and |±〉(n,m) =
(
|±〉(m)
)⊗n
. We
therefore obtain on the block level
|φk,l〉(m) = 1√
2
[
|0〉⊗m |k〉⊗m + (−1)l |1〉⊗m |1− k〉⊗m
]
∼= 1√
2
[
|0, k〉⊗m + (−1)l |1, 1− k〉⊗m
]
=
1√
2m+1
[
(|φk,0〉+ |φk,1〉)⊗m + (−1)l (|φk,0〉 − |φk,1〉)⊗m
]
=
1√
2m+1
 ∑
~r∈{0,1}m
m⊗
i=1
|φk,ri〉+ (−1)l
∑
~r∈{0,1}m
m⊗
i=1
(−1)ri |φk,ri〉

=
1√
2m+1
∑
~r∈{0,1}m
[
1 + (−1)l+
∑m
j=1 rj
] m⊗
i=1
|φk,ri〉
=
1√
2m−1
∑
~r∈Al,m
m⊗
i=1
|φk,ri〉 , (A3)
where the symbol ∼= indicates the mode reordering mentioned in Sec. III. On the other hand, independent of the
encoding level, the Bell states can always be written in the Pauli X-basis as
|φk,l〉∗ = 1√
2
[|0, k〉∗ + (−1)l |1, 1− k〉∗]
=
1
2
√
2
[(|+〉∗ + |−〉∗) (|+〉∗ + (−1)k |−〉∗)+ (−1)l (|+〉∗ − |−〉∗) (|+〉∗ − (−1)k |−〉∗)]
=
1√
2
[
|(−1)l+,+〉∗ + (−1)k |(−1)l−,−〉∗
]
.
On the logical level, we use this to obtain
|φk,l〉(n,m) = 1√
2
[(
|(−1)l+〉(m)
)⊗n (
|+〉(m)
)⊗n
+ (−1)k
(
|(−1)l−〉(m)
)⊗n (
|−〉(m)
)⊗n]
∼= 1√
2
[(
|(−1)l+,+〉(m)
)⊗n
+ (−1)k
(
|(−1)l−,−〉(m)
)⊗n]
=
1√
2n+1
[(
|φ0,l〉(m) + |φ1,l〉(m)
)⊗n
+ (−1)k
(
|φ0,l〉(m) − |φ1,l〉(m)
)⊗n]
.
At this point it becomes clear that, compared to the derivation on the block level (A3), the indices k and l have simply
swapped their roles. This yields (A2) immediately.
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Appendix B: Error Propagation Formula Simplification
We present the simplification of the error propagation formulas (22) and (25) of the main text into (23) and (26),
respectively:
Bu,1 =
1
2m−1
m∑
r=0
r even
∑
α,β∈N70
|α|=m−r
|β|=r
(
m
α, β
)
Pα·,1P
β
·,2 δfu(α+β)
=
1
2m
m∑
r=0
[1 + (−1)r]
∑
γ,β∈N70
|γ|=m
|β|=r
(
m
γ − β, β
)
P γ−β·,1 P
β
·,2 δfu(γ)
=
1
2m
m∑
r=0
[1 + (−1)r]
∑
β˜,γ˜∈N60
(
m
γ˜ − β˜, β˜
)(
m− |γ˜|
m− r − |γ˜ − β˜|, r − |β˜|
)
P˜ γ˜−β˜·,1 P
m−r−|γ˜−β˜|
7,1 P˜
β˜
·,2P
r−|β˜|
7,2 δfu(γ˜,m−|γ˜|)
=
1
2m
∑
β˜,γ˜∈N60
(
m
γ˜ − β˜, β˜
)
P˜ γ˜−β˜·,1 P˜
β˜
·,2δfu(γ˜,m−|γ˜|)
m−|β˜|∑
r=−|β˜|
(
m− |γ˜|
r
)[
1 + (−1)r+|β˜|
]
P
m−|γ˜|−r
7,1 P
r
7,2
=
1
2m
∑
β˜,γ˜∈N60
(
m
γ˜ − β˜, β˜
)
P˜ γ˜−β˜·,1 P˜
β˜
·,2δfu(γ˜,m−|γ˜|)
[
(P7,1 + P7,2)
m−|γ˜| + (−1)|β˜|(P7,1 − P7,2)m−|γ˜|
]
=
1
2m
∑
γ˜∈N60
(
m
γ˜
)
δfu(γ˜,m−|γ˜|)
[
(P˜·,1 + P˜·,2)γ˜(P7,1 + P7,2)m−|γ˜| + (P˜·,1 − P˜·,2)γ˜(P7,1 − P7,2)m−|γ˜|
]
=
1
2m
∑
γ∈N70
|γ|=m
(
m
γ
)
δfu(γ) [(P·,1 + P·,2)
γ + (P·,1 − P·,2)γ ] .
The main idea here is to order terms such that the sum over r contains only the terms P7,1 and P7,2 and can then
be executed explicitly. This is achieved by a multiple use of multinomial coefficient decompositions
(
m
k1,k2,k3
)
=(
m
k1,k2
)(
m−k1−k2
k3
)
and representing P·,1 as (P˜·,1, P7,1). The derivation of (26) from (25) is done in perfect analogy.
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Appendix C: Nonlinear Optics: Generating QPC(n,m)-states with Coherent Photon Conversion
In order to generate both the encoded qubits and the ancillary encoded Bell states at the repeater stations we
propose two different schemes. The first one, presented in this section is based on coherent photon conversion (CPC),
as it was proposed in Ref. [30]. Here a four-wave-mixing interaction,
H = γab†c†d+ γ∗a†bcd†, (C1)
as realizable by a standard commercial, polarization-maintaining photonic crystal fiber (PCF), is pumped in one
mode, e.g. that expressed by the annihilation operator d, with a bright classical beam to obtain effectively a three-
wave-mixing Hamiltonian,
H˜ = γ˜ab†c† + γ˜∗a†bc, (C2)
with a strong, tunable, nonlinear coupling γ˜ ∝ γEd where Ed is the (tunable) electric field amplitude of the pumping
beam. The Hilbert space {|1, 0, 0〉 , |0, 1, 1〉} is an eigenspace of this Hamiltonian H˜. Therefore, a state from this
Hilbert space undergoes Rabi-like oscillations when evolving under H˜. Especially, for an appropriate combination of
coupling strength and interaction time, namely γ˜t~ =
pi
2 , this can be used as a photon doppler, because
e−i
pi
2 H˜ |100〉 = |011〉 .
As a result, the two photons are now in modes b and c. If desired, a transformation into two modes of frequency ωa
is possible with the use of two more CPC elements and by weakly pumping the remaining mode (c or b). For more
details, see Fig. 1b of Ref. [30].
Since the vacuum passes the CPC element unchanged, the photon doppler setup can be used to transform qubit
states into Bell- or GHZ-type states:
e−i
pi
2 H˜ (α |0〉+ β |1〉)⊗ |00〉 = |0〉 ⊗ (α |00〉+ β |11〉) . (C3)
With the help of polarizing beam splitters it is also possible to build up a scheme that can do the same for polarization-
encoded qubits (see Fig. 2a) and b) in the Supplementary Material of Ref. [30]):
α |H〉+ β |V 〉 α |HH〉+ β |V V 〉
When concatenating this photon doppling and using half wave plates oriented at 22.5◦ to the optical axis (which
realizes a Hadamard gate on polarization-encoded qubits), a scheme for generating arbitrary QPC(n,m)-states is
obtained:
. . .
...
(m)
...
α |H〉 + β |V 〉
α |H〉⊗m + β |V 〉⊗m
FIG. 8. Concatenating m− 1 photon dopplers gives a GHZ-type state with m photons.
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α |H〉 + β |V 〉
HWP
@22.5◦
(n)
HWP
@22.5◦
(m)
...
...
HWP
@22.5◦
(m)
...
α |0〉(n,m) + β |1〉(n,m)
(n,m)
...
FIG. 9. To generate an arbitrary QPC(n,m) encoded state, an array of nm − 1 photon dopplers and n + 1 half-wave-plates,
i.e. Hadamard gates, is used.
1√
2
(|H〉 + |V 〉)
(n,m)
...
(n,m)
...
|φ0,0〉(n,m)
FIG. 10. The ancillary Bell states at the repeater stations can be produced using two copies of the QPC(n,m) generation
scheme and one photon doppler to obtain the inital Bell state. This setup requires a total of 2nm− 1 photon doppler modules.
A state generation scheme as depicted in Fig. 8 - 10 gives exactly the (linear) cost scaling of nm upon which the
cost function C as given in the main text relies, since for creating a QPC(n,m)-encoded Bell state 2nm− 1 copies of
the photon doppler scheme are required.
It should be noted, however, that in this state generation scheme we depend on a strong nonlinear interaction,
realizable with the techniques of coherent photon conversion. These nonlinearities could, in principle, also be used
to obtain a unit-efficiency Bell measurement on the physical level. Employing these in our communication scheme
instead of the standard linear optics BMs would allow the use of smaller quantum parity codes. However, the first
main point of our proposal is to present a highly effective and loss-resistant Bell measurement on the quantum parity
codes with the comparatively simple tools of linear optics.
Next, we take a look at the fault resistance of this state generation scheme. As was explained in Sec. II, all errors
that occur on individual physical-level qubits can be incorporated into the error channel of the transmission protocol
and are taken care of there. However, errors that occur during the state generation often lead to non-local errors in
the resulting state. We analyze three stages of the state generation.
The first stage is generating the initial one-photon state |ψ〉 = α |H〉+β |V 〉. Current photon sources cannot produce
pure states of this form on demand and instead give a mixed state with a vacuum portion ρ = ηs |ψ〉 〈ψ|+(1−ηs) |0〉 〈0|.
The vacuum state passes the CPC-elements unchanged and, as a result, the outcome of the state generation scheme
can then be written as ηs |ψ〉(n,m) 〈ψ|(n,m) + (1 − ηs) |0〉⊗2nm 〈0|⊗2nm. For the case that such a multimode-vacuum
emerges in a repeater station during a time interval t0 instead of a QPC Bell state, the logical BM will (heraldedly) fail
at this station and thus the transmission does not succeed. The transmission rate when including the corresponding
probabilistic element from the imperfect photon sources becomes R = η
Ltot/L0
s pLtot/L0/t0. Due to this exponential
scaling, the value for ηs must be extremely close to one to still obtain acceptable communication rates. For example,
for a transmission distance of 1 000 km and a repeater spacing of 2 km the vacuum probability 1− ηs must be smaller
than 0.0014 to allow for repeater rates R > 0.5/t0. Unfortunately, current photon sources do not reach this near-
deterministic regime, but are more commonly at values of about ηs ≈ 0.5. Yet, by using multiple heralded photon
sources and a little feedforward (so-called multiplexing) at the state preparation stage, it is possible to obtain a
sufficient photon generation probability. For example, ten sources with ηs = 0.5 yield at least one photon with
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probability 1 − (1 − ηs)10 ≈ 0.9990. Note that, in this case, it is not necessary to have 10 instances of the nonlinear
photon multiplying scheme presented in the above figures, because the feedforward operation takes place before that.
The second stage of the state generation scheme includes all steps to transform the single-photon state into an
n-photon state (2n for the Bell state generation). Every photon is then the seed for one of the blocks of the QPC
state. Should any of these photons be lost, the entire corresponding block is missing in the final state. This will lead
to a (heralded) failure of the entire BM. Therefore the probability to lose any photons in this stage must be reduced
as much as possible. Luckily, both the linear and the non-linear parts of the photon doppling can be performed
near-deterministically [30]. Should, nevertheless, the obtained success probability for the second stage of the state
generation scheme be too small, multiplexing this stage as well would still be an option. Only very few instances
would be required at every repeater station, as the base probability is already quite high. The important task of
heralding the failure to initiate the feed-forward operation can be performed by generating an n + 1-photon GHZ
state instead of the n-photon GHZ state and measuring the additional photon in the X-basis. Due to the simple
concatenation structure of the GHZ-state generation (see Fig. 8), the last photon is only present if all other n photons
are as well. The possible (heralded) phase-flip induced by the X-basis measurement can easily be corrected with the
help of a Z-gate on any of the remaining modes. Using, for example, three multiplying instances (Fig. 8) with a total
success rate of 0.9 each, together with 10 photon sources of efficiency ηs = 0.5 per instance, we obtain a probability
of ≈ 0.9990 for a successful generation of the desired GHZ state.
In the third stage of the generation scheme, the individual blocks are built up. Should a photon be lost in this
stage, the resulting block can still be used for the identification of the Bell-state index k in this block, as long as
at least one physical BM succeeds. Only its ability to identify the index l is gone. The remaining block is thus
still useful, even though with the loss of one photon no more extra photons will be added to the state due to the
linear concatenation scheme in Fig. 8. The number of lost photons can be further decreased by using a more tree-like
concatenation structure. Then only those modes of the branches starting at the point of loss will be empty instead
of all later modes. This decreased number of photon loss increases the chance for at least one physical BM to be
successful. We expect the effect of losses in this stage on the transmission rate to be quite small, as long as the chance
to lose photons particularly early within the third stage is not too high.
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Appendix D: Linear Optics: Generating QPC(n,m)-states with Multiplexing and Feedforward
In this section we present an alternative scheme to generate the required QPC encoded Bell states at every repeater
station. Instead of utilizing nonlinear effects like the coherent photon conversion used in Appendix C we restrict
ourselves to linear optical components: single-photon sources, both standard and polarizing beam splitters, and
photon detectors. Additionally, we investigate the resource cost requirement of this scheme. As a measure for the
cost we use the number of single-photon sources required to near-deterministically create a QPC(n,m) Bell state. We
will show that the number of photon sources scales approximately as Ns = D(nm)
log2(8/3) ≈ D(nm)1.415.
To generate the QPC encoded Bell states with a very high probability and this comparatively little number of
photon sources we rely on two methods that go beyond the standard, passive, linear optical toolkit:
• As much as we would like to generate the QPC states with a static linear optical setup, the success probability
for this would be extremely small, and thus demand for an extremely large number of photon sources. To
circumvent this we use a multiplexing scheme similar to that of Ref. [13]. Our scheme is described in detail
below. The general idea is to start with a large number of entangled states each conatining only a few photons
and then joining them with the help of Bell measurements to increase the number of entangled photons. The
probabilistic nature of both the generation of the small entangled states and the linear optical Bell measurement
is counteracted by using feedforward techniques (multiplexing).
• As mentioned in the main text, the success probability of a standard linear optical BM is limited to 12 . We
use additional photons to boost the success probability to 34 [29]. The number of these additional photons is of
course included in Ns.
In the first step of our state generation scheme six unentangled photons are used to heraldedly generate a 3-qubit-
GHZ state |GHZ3〉 = 1√2 (|HHH〉+ |V V V 〉). This is done through a probabilistic process presented in detail in the
Supplementary Material of Ref. [44]. It succeeds with a probability of 132 . Next, the GHZ states are combined with
Bell measurements to get states of the form
|B(1,m)〉 = 1√
2
[
|0〉(m) |φ0,0〉+ |1〉(m) |φ0,1〉
]
. (D1)
A detailed description, how this works, is given below. In the next stage of our state generation scheme, the states
|B(1,m)〉 are connected with BMs to produce
|B(n,m)〉 = 1√
2
[
|0〉(n,m) |φ0,0〉+ |1〉(n,m) |φ0,1〉
]
. (D2)
These basic states, consisting of the codewords |0〉(n,m) and |1〉(n,m) and two additional photons, can be used to obtain
a QPC(n,m) Bell state by first measuring one of the two additional photons in each state in the X-basis and finally
performing a Bell measurement on the remaining extra photons.
Let us now turn to the details of creating the states |B(1,m)〉 from 3-qubit-GHZ states (see also Fig. 11). The
smallest one,
|B(1,1)〉 = 1
2
(|HHH〉+ |HV V 〉+ |V HH〉 − |V V V 〉) , (D3)
can easily be obtained from a 3-qubit-GHZ state by applying a Hadamard gate to the first photon. To create the
next one, |B(1,2)〉, a 3-qubit-GHZ state and the state |B(1,1)〉 are combined with a Bell measurement. In our notation
the Bell measurement is, if not mentioned otherwise, always applied to the first photons of the partaking states. We
obtain
|GHZ3〉 ⊗ |B(1,1)〉 = 1√
2
(|HHH〉+ |V V V 〉)⊗ 1
2
(|HHH〉+ |HV V 〉+ |V HH〉 − |V V V 〉)
BM−→ 1
2
(|HHHH〉+ |HHV V 〉+ |V V HH〉 − |V V V V 〉) = |B(1,2)〉 . (D4)
Here we assumed that the Bell measurement yields the result |φ0,0〉. If any other Bell state is identified the above
is only true up to some Pauli corrections. Depending on the outcome |φk,l〉 of the BM the correction is given by
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(X1X2)
kZl1. The above result can be generalized to the case of combining any GHZ state with any state |B(1,ν)〉:
|GHZµ+2〉 ⊗ |B(1,ν)〉 = 1√
2
(
|H〉 |0〉(µ+1) + |V 〉 |1〉(µ+1)
)
⊗ 1√
2
(
|H〉 |0〉(ν−1) |φ0,0〉+ |V 〉 |1〉(ν−1) |φ0,1〉
)
BM−→ 1
2
[(
|0〉(µ+1) |0〉(ν−1) + |1〉(µ+1) |1〉(ν−1)
)
|φ0,0〉+
(
|0〉(µ+1) |1〉(ν−1) + |1〉(µ+1) |0〉(ν−1)
)
|φ0,1〉
]
=
1√
2
[
|0〉(µ+ν) |φ0,0〉+ |1〉(µ+ν) |φ0,1〉
]
= |B(1,µ+ν)〉 . (D5)
Again, depending on the BM outcome certain Pauli corrections are necessary:
(∏µ−1
j=1 Xj
)k
Zl1.
The larger GHZ states, on the other hand, can be obtained by combining two smaller GHZ states:
|GHZµ〉 ⊗ |GHZν〉 BM−→ |GHZµ+ν−2〉 . (D6)
Once again, the Bell measurement result implies some Pauli-corrections: Zlµ
(∏µ+ν−2
j=µ Xj
)k
.
Once the states |B(1,m)〉 are ready, they can be combined into |B(2,m)〉 with a Bell measurement. However, this
time the BM is performed on the last photons of the partaking states, i.e. in each state one of the photons of the
Bell-state-part is used. This shall be denoted by BM’.
|B(1,m)〉 ⊗ |B(1,m)〉
=
1
2
[
|0〉(m) |φ0,0〉 |0〉(m) |φ0,0〉+ |0〉(m) |φ0,0〉 |1〉(m) |φ0,1〉+ |1〉(m) |φ0,1〉 |0〉(m) |φ0,0〉+ |1〉(m) |φ0,1〉 |1〉(m) |φ0,1〉
]
BM′−→ 1
2
[(
|0〉(m) |0〉(m) + |1〉(m) |1〉(m)
)
|φ0,0〉+
(
|0〉(m) |1〉(m) + |1〉(m) |0〉(m)
)
|φ0,0〉
]
=
1√
2
[
|0〉(2,m) |φ0,0〉+ |1〉(2,m) |φ0,0〉
]
= |B(2,m)〉 . (D7)
Here we have collected the remaining photons of the Bell-state-parts at the end directly after performing the Bell
measurement and have furthermore assumed the Bell measurement to have the result |φ0,0〉, in any other case the
required corrections are: Zkm+1Z
l
2m+1X
k
2m+2. Additionally we have used the following property of the QPC encoding:
|0〉(n1,m) |0〉(n2,m) + |1〉(n1,m) |1〉(n2,m) = |0〉(n1+n2,m) ,
|0〉(n1,m) |1〉(n2,m) + |1〉(n1,m) |0〉(n2,m) = |1〉(n1+n2,m) . (D8)
This also allows us to generalize the above result to
|B(n1,m)〉 ⊗ |B(n2,m)〉 BM
′
−→ |B(n1+n2,m)〉 , (D9)
with the correction
(∏n2−1
j=0 Z(n1+j)m+1
)k
Zl(n1+n2)m+1X
k
(n1+n2)m+2
depending on the Bell measurement result. With
this we can create every |B(n,m)〉-state from single photons.
To finally obtain the QPC(n,m) Bell states, the |B(n,m)〉-states are first subjected to an X-basis measurement on the
last photon to obtain
|B(n,m)X 〉 =
1√
2
[
|0〉(n,m) |+〉+ |1〉(n,m) |−〉
]
(D10)
(assuming the result |+〉 of the X-basis measurement, otherwise after applying Znm+1), and then a Bell measurement
BM’ is performed. We get
|B(n,m)X 〉 ⊗ |B(n,m)X 〉 BM
′
−→ 1√
2
[
|0〉(n,m) |0〉(n,m) + |1〉(n,m) |1〉(n,m)
]
= |φ0,0〉(n,m) , (D11)
if the BM yields |φ0,0〉, otherwise the correction is
(∏m
j1=1
Xj1
)l (∏n2−1
j2=0
Zn1m+j2m+1
)k
.
It should be noted that all the corrections mentioned above do not have to be performed immediately after the
respective Bell measurements. It suffices to keep track of all implied corrections and interpret the outcomes of the
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following Bell measurements accordingly [this includes that the implied corrections by this second Bell measurement
depend on the (not executed) corrections of the first BM]. This allows to delay all necessary Pauli corrections to the
final step and thus reduces the maximum number of necessary corrections to 2nm.
Let us now turn to the resource consumption of this state generation approach. For our communication scheme to
work we will require an encoded Bell state at every repeater station. Therefore, the success probability of the state
generation psg must be very close to one, as it will appear in the communication rate as a global factor p
Ltot/L0
sg .
For example, if we attempt communicating over Ltot = 1 000 km with a repeater spacing of L0 = 2 km and demand
that the state generation probability reduces the secure key rate by no more than 50%, we obtain 1 − psg ≤ 10−3.
To achieve this success probability we attempt to generate a large enough pool of |B(n,m)X 〉 states, perform the Bell
measurement and select one of the pairs where the BM was successful. The size of the pool nX depends on the
required state generation probability and the BM success probability:
1− (1− pBM)b
nX
2 c ≥ psg. (D12)
For the above example of 1 − psg ≤ 10−3 and a BM success probability of 75%, as achieved in Ref. [29], this yields
nX ≥ 10. It is not extremely important that in every attempt, the pool contains nX or more |B(n,m)X 〉-states, since
also for nX − 2 states the chance of at least one successful BM is relatively high. However, on average, nX states
should be available. This marks an important change in the point of view: from exact probabilities to average values.
The latter is less general, but allows for a much easier estimation of the number of photon sources required.
The states |B(n,m)X 〉 are created from two states |B(n/2,m)〉 with probability pBM according to (D9) (for simplicity
we assume n = 2λ here). Thus, to get on average nX states |B(n,m)X 〉, we need (on average) 2nXpBM states |B(n/2,m)〉. We
use feedforward operations to only direct the successfully joined states into the pool of |B(n,m)X 〉-states. Basically, we
are multiplexing. This can be continued down to the |B(1,m)〉-states: we will need (on average) nX
(
2
pBM
)λ
of them.
The states |B(1,m)〉 themselves can be created from |B(1,m/2)〉 states and |GHZm/2+2〉 states, see Eq. (D5) (again we
assume m = 2κ for simplicity). To obtain the nX
(
2
pBM
)λ
states |B(1,m)〉, on average, nX
(
2
pBM
)λ
1
pBM
states of each
above type are required. Now this can in turn be continued down to |B(1,1)〉 and |GHZ3〉-states, and since these two
differ only by a Hadamard gate, in total, nX
(
2
pBM
)λ+κ
GHZ states are needed. As was already stated above, GHZ
states can be generated from six single photons with a success probability of 132 . Thus, on average, 192 photons are
required to create a GHZ state and thus, on average,
N˜s = 192nX
(
2
pBM
)λ+κ
= 192nX
(
2
pBM
)log2(n)+log2(m)
= 192nX (nm)
log2(2/pBM) , (D13)
single photons are required to obtain one QPC encoded Bell state with a probability larger than psg.
If the code parameters n and m are no powers of 2, the state generation becomes more involved, since unequal states
have to be combined at BMs and some states are not used in the next multiplexing-level immediately (see Fig. 11).
However, the estimate above is still quite good. A very conservative estimate would be obtained by using the number
of multiplexing levels required, which is dlog2(n)e + dlog2(m)e which is bounded by log2(nm) + 2, and furthermore
assume that on every level all states are immediately used in a BM. We then get an additional factor (2/pBM)
2 in the
upper bound for the required photon number.
In all of the above calculations the resource cost for the Bell measurement was not yet taken into account. To
estimate the number of additional photons injected to boost the BM probability we merely need to count the number
of BMs. We will stick to the case of n = 2λ and m = 2κ for simplicity. In the last step nX2 Bell measurements are
performed to attempt joining the |B(n,m)X 〉 states into QPC-Bell states. On the level below, for each of the nX states,
on average, 1pBM BM attempts are made. In the next lower level the number of BMs increases by another factor
2
pBM
and so on. If every BM requires nBM additional photons, we get in total
NBM = nBM
nX
2
λ+κ∑
k=0
(
2
pBM
)k
= nBM
nX
2
1
1− 2pBM
[
1−
(
2
pBM
)log2(nm)+1]
≈ nBMnX
2
1
1− pBM2
(nm)
log2(2/pBM) .
This has the same scaling as N˜s, but the factor
nBM
2
1
1− pBM2
is much smaller than 192. When using the BM scheme
presented in Ref. [29], which uses 4 additional photons to boost the BM efficiency to 75%, we get a factor 165 = 3.2.
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Thus, the number of photons injected to boost the BM efficiency makes less than 2% of the total number Ns =
N˜s +NBM. We finally obtain the resource consumption of our linear-optics state generation scheme:
Ns =
(
192 + 165
)
10(nm)log2(8/3) ≈ 1952(nm)1.415. (D14)
We would like to make some additional remarks regarding the error robustness of this state generation scheme. The
3-qubit-GHZ-state generation scheme given in Ref. [44] has the appealing property that the GHZ output states have
the form of GHZ states on which individual loss channels acted on all three photons. Together with the fact that
joining states via Bell measurements does not introduce non-local errors, we find that the final QPC Bell state is
afflicted only by local errors that act on individual photons. As we have seen in the main text, our logical Bell
measurement and thus the entire communication scheme can handle this type of errors quite well. However, since
the errors present in the state preparation (mainly photon loss) will also occur on photons that are measured during
the state preparation, the success probability of joining states in a BM and thus the success probability of generating
QPC-encoded Bell states is reduced. In a conservative estimate, we assume that all photons that are measured during
the state preparation are subject to a loss channel of strength ηsg (this includes losses from the GHZ generation
scheme and losses due to time spent on the state generation chip). The number of photons required for successful
state generation is then given by
Ns =
(
192
η3sg
+ 165
)
nX(nm)
log2
(
8
3η2sg
)
. (D15)
The pool size nX for |B(n,m)X 〉 is increased, since in Eq. (D12) pBM is replaced by pBMη4sg (not only the photons of
the BM but also those that are measured in the X-basis must be present). If we assume ηsg = 0.97 we get nX = 14
and obtain the scaling Ns = 2732.8(nm)
1.503. This means that for the typical number of photons in a QPC state (10
to 1000), the errors in the state generation scheme imply an increase of the number of required photon sources by
a factor of about 2.5. In Table VII we give the number of required photon sources per repeater station for several
QPCs assuming, as above, that over a total distance of Ltot = 1 000 km repeater stations are placed with a spacing
of L0 = 2 km and that the influence of the probabilistic state generation reduces the secure key rate by no more than
50%, i.e. 1 − psg ≤ 10−3. For comparison, we also give the required number of photons when using the standard
linear optical BM instead of the 34 -efficient one of Ref. [29].
(n,m) pBM =
3
4
, ηsg = 1 pBM =
3
4
, ηsg = 0.97 pBM =
1
2
, ηsg = 1 pBM =
1
2
, ηsg = 0.97
(4,2) 37 · 103 62 · 103 246 · 103 354 · 103
(10,3) 240 · 103 454 · 103 3.5 · 106 5.6 · 106
(18,4) 829 · 103 1.7 · 106 19 · 106 35 · 106
(23,5) 1.6 · 106 3.4 · 106 51 · 106 92 · 106
(28,6) 2.8 · 106 6.0 · 106 108 · 106 204 · 106
(38,6) 4.3 · 106 9.6 · 106 200 · 106 368 · 106
(67,11) 22 · 106 56 · 106 2.1 · 109 4.5 · 109
TABLE VII. Required number of single photon sources to assure that state generation does not reduce the secure key rate by
more than 50%. Parameters: Ltot = 1 000 km, L0 = 2 km.
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FIG. 11. State generation for a QPC(6,4) Bell state.
Left: This flowchart shows which states are combined on each multiplexing level, to obtain |φ0,0〉(6,4) from |GHZ3〉-states.
Starting from the bottom the states are either transformed using local, deterministic operations (dashed lines), i.e. Hadamard-
gates, X-basis measurements, or simply doing nothing, or two states are combined with a Bell measurement (solid lines). At
some points throughout the multiplexing scheme pools, e.g. the GHZ3 pool on the second level, must be split in parts and
different actions are performed. The ratio of the parts is chosen to optimize the protocol: since equally many |B(1,2)〉 and
|GHZ4〉 states are used in the |B(1,4)〉 generation, 23 of the |GHZ3〉-states are used for |GHZ4〉 generation and 13 for |B(1,2)〉
generation.
Right: Here we show the state combinations as presented in eqs. (D4) – (D11) in the form of cluster states (note that the states
in the equations are not the standard representatives of the cluster states shown here). Ellipses include the photons which are
used in a BM, the Hadamard-gate at the bottom left as well as the X-basis measurements at the top are performed before the
respective BM. In the final QPC-encoded Bell state at the top right, one can clearly see the 6 blocks of 4 photons for each of
the logical qubits, as well as the fact, that every block is connected with all blocks of the other logical qubits but not with the
blocks of its own logical qubit.
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Appendix E: Derivation of the Outcome Probabilities P
(dc)
u,v in the Presence of Dark Counts
In this section we derive the outcome probabilities P
(dc)
u,v in the presence of dark counts. It should be noted that we
restrict ourselves here to the case of the standard linear optical BM with an efficiency of 12 , as depicted in Fig. 2 c)
of the main text, since this corresponds to the most important case in our communication scenario. Furthermore, we
assume the use of detectors that can resolve up to two photons, which is also the standard situation in our work. We
have also investigated the combination of dark counts and on-off detectors (see Sec.VI E), but since no conceptually
new effects arise in this case, we shall focus here only on the PNRD case.
To calculate the outcome probabilities P
(dc)
u,v for detectors that exhibit dark counts, we first have to calculate the
probabilities p
(dc)
µ→ν that a detector recognizes ν photons, although µ photons have entered it. In Sec. VI C we have
already described the model for a dark-count-afflicted detector: an ideal photon-number-resolving detector is preceded
by a beam splitter with transmission coefficient ηd whose second input mode is occupied by a thermal state,
ρth(n¯) =
∞∑
l=0
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
|l〉 〈l| , (E1)
with the average photon number n¯. If an arbitrary photonic state ρin =
∑
j,k ρj,k |j〉 〈k| enters the detector, the
corresponding two-mode state is given by
ρin ⊗ ρth(n¯) =
∑
l
∑
j,k
ρj,k
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
|j, l〉 〈k, l|
=
∑
l,j,k
ρj,k
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
1√
j!l!
(
a†1
)j (
a†2
)l
|0, 0〉 〈0, 0| ak1al2
1√
k!l!
. (E2)
The beam splitter with transmission ηd mixes the modes via a
†
1 →
√
ηda
†
1 +
√
1− ηda†2 and a†2 →
√
ηda
†
2−
√
1− ηda†1.
With the use of the binomial identity we obtain
ρin ⊗ ρth(n¯)
BSηd−→
∑
l,j,k
ρj,k
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
∑
n1,m1,n2,m2
1√
j!l!
(
j
n1
)(
l
m1
)√
ηd
j−n1+l−m1√1− ηdn1+m1(−1)m1
×
(
a†1
)j−n1+m1 (
a†2
)n1+l−m1 |0, 0〉 〈0, 0| ak−n2+m21 an2+l−m22
×√ηdk−n2+l−m2
√
1− ηdn2+m2(−1)m2
(
k
n2
)(
l
m2
)
1√
k!l!
. (E3)
The state entering the ideal photon detector is now given by tracing over the second mode. We denote the summation
index for this partial trace operation by s and get
ρin −→
∑
l,j,k
ρj,k
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
∑
n1,n2
∑
s
1√
j!l!
(
j
n1
)(
l
s− n1
)√
ηd
j−2n1+s√1− ηd2n1+l−s(−1)n1+l−s
×
√
s!
√
(j + l − s)! |j + l − s〉 〈k + l − s|
√
s!
√
(k + l − s)!
×√ηdk−2n2+s
√
1− ηd2n2+l−s(−1)n2+l−s
(
k
n2
)(
l
s− n2
)
1√
k!l!
. (E4)
By inserting two unit operations (
∑
u δu,j =
∑
u 〈u|j〉 and
∑
v δk,v =
∑
v 〈k|v〉) we are able to isolate the input state
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and obtain
ρin −→
∑
l,s
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
(∑
u,n1
√
(u+ l − s)!s!
u!l!
(
u
n1
)(
l
s− n1
)√
ηd
u+s−2n1√1− ηdl−s+2n1(−1)l−s+n1 |u+ l − s〉 〈u|)
×
∑
j,k
ρj,k |j〉 〈k|

×
(∑
v,n2
√
(v + l − s)!s!
v!l!
(
v
n2
)(
l
s− n2
)√
ηd
v+s−2n2√1− ηdl−s+2n2(−1)l−s+n2 |v〉 〈v + l − s|)
=
∑
l,s
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
Ks,l ρin K
†
s,l, (E5)
with the error operators
Ks,l =
∑
u
√
(u+ l − s)!s!
u!l!
ξs,l,u(ηd) |u+ l − s〉 〈u| , (E6)
ξs,l,u(ηd) =
∑
n1
(
u
n1
)(
l
s− n1
)√
ηd
u+s−2n1√1− ηdl−s+2n1(−1)l−s+n1 . (E7)
This channel map in terms of Kraus-operator-sum representation describes a Gaussian thermal noise channel with
loss parameter ηd and thermal mean photon number n¯. The probabilities p
(dc)
µ→ν are now given by
p(dc)µ→ν = 〈ν|
∑
l,s
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
Ks,l|µ〉 〈µ| K†s,l|ν〉 =
∑
l,s
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
|〈ν|Ks,l|µ〉|2 . (E8)
It suffices to investigate the diagonal entries |µ〉 〈µ| of the input states, because the result of the ideal photon detector
only depends on the diagonal entries in Eq. (E5) and the error channel described by the operators in Eq. (E6) does
not mix diagonals of the density matrix.
As already mentioned in Sec. VI C only a few of the probabilities p
(dc)
µ→ν are actually needed. With no other source
of additional photons besides the dark counts described in this model we have µ ≤ 2. Furthermore, we assume that
the photon detectors resolve 0,1, and ≥ 2 photons and thus we can restrict the calculation to ν ≤ 1. In addition to the
exact results of Eq. (E8) we also give the first-order terms of the Taylor series with respect to small average photon
numbers in the thermal state n¯ 1:
p
(dc)
0→0 =
∑
l,s
n¯l
(n¯+ 1)l+1
δl,sη
l
d =
1
1 + n¯
∑
l
(
n¯ηd
1 + n¯
)l
=
1
1 + n¯(1− ηd) ≈ 1− n¯(1− ηd)
p
(dc)
0→1 =
n¯(1− ηd)
(1 + n¯(1− ηd))2 ≈ n¯(1− ηd)
p
(dc)
0→≥2 = 1− p(dc)0→0 − p(dc)0→1 =
n¯2(1− ηd)2
(1 + n¯(1− ηd))2 ≈ 0
p
(dc)
1→0 =
(1− ηd)(1 + n¯)
(1 + n¯(1− ηd))2 ≈ (1− ηd) + n¯(1− ηd)(2ηd − 1)
p
(dc)
1→1 =
ηd + (1− ηd)2n¯(1 + n¯)
(1 + n¯(1− ηd))3 ≈ ηd + n¯(1− ηd)(1− 4ηd)
p
(dc)
1→≥2 = 1− p(dc)1→0 − p(dc)1→1 =
n¯(1− ηd)[2ηd + n¯(1− ηd) + n¯2(1− ηd)2]
(1 + n¯(1− ηd))3 ≈ n¯2(1− ηd)ηd
p
(dc)
2→0 =
(1− ηd)2(1 + n¯)2
(1 + n¯(1− ηd))3 ≈ (1− ηd)
2 + n¯(1− ηd)2(3ηd − 1)
p
(dc)
2→1 =
(1 + n¯)(1− ηd)[2ηd + n¯(1 + n¯)(1− ηd)2]
(1 + n¯(1− ηd))4 ≈ 2(1− ηd)ηd + n¯(1− ηd)(1− 8ηd + 9η
2
d)
p
(dc)
2→≥2 = 1− p(dc)2→0 − p(dc)2→1 ≈ η2d + n¯2ηd(1− ηd)(2− 3ηd)
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In order to obtain the BM outcome probabilities P
(dc)
u,v from the above detector outcome probabilities, we first have
to take a look at the click patterns that an undisturbed Bell state would produce in an ideal detector and then
conclude which of the actually occurring click patterns shall be accepted as a certain BM result. The click patterns
are given according to the order of the detectors in Fig. 2 c), i.e., (H1, V1, V2, H2). As already described in Sec. IV
both |φ0,l〉-states yield the click pattern (2, 0, 0, 0) or permutations hereof. On the other hand, the state |φ1,0〉 gives
(1, 1, 0, 0) or (0, 0, 1, 1) and the state |φ1,1〉 gives patterns (1, 0, 1, 0) or (0, 1, 0, 1).
Let us now discuss the interpretation of actual click patterns obtained from dark-count-afflicted detectors. First,
there is the possibility that no photons are detected at all, i.e. the click pattern is (0, 0, 0, 0). Just like in the case
without dark counts, this pattern does not contain any information on the original undisturbed Bell states. The same
holds for click patterns with only one photon, i.e. (1, 0, 0, 0) and permutations hereof. It is equally probable to obtain
these click patterns from all four Bell states. The case of two detected photons corresponds to the accepted Bell
measurements in the ideal case. Thus, also in the presence of dark counts, click patterns that match the above ideal
ones, should be accepted. However, it is possible now to obtain such click patterns with a combination of photon loss
and dark counts. If exactly one of the two initial photons is lost [either during transmission (1− ηt)ηd or within the
detector ηt2(1 − ηd)ηd], while at the same time a single dark count occurs, then still two photons will be detected.
Depending on the position in which of the four detectors the dark count occurred, the state will be either identified
correctly, or as another Bell state, or a pattern indicates failure of the BM [the latter is the case for the patterns
(1, 0, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 1, 0)]. Since the probability of a dark count is the same for all detectors, this outcome distribution
is similar to that of a depolarizing error channel with
 = 2(dc) = 2 [(1− ηt)ηd + ηt2(1− ηd)ηd] n¯(1− ηd) ≡ 2p−1pdc, (E9)
(with the exception of the failing BM). In principle, it is also possible to obtain two detector clicks by losing both
initial photons followed by two dark counts. However, this is much more unlikely, since we are mainly concerned with
small dark count probabilities. Furthermore, since we assume detectors that can resolve only up to two photons, input
states such as |3000〉 or |4000〉, and so on, will be recognized as (2, 0, 0, 0) and are thus interpreted as |φ0,?〉. This is
fine though, because the probability of obtaining such a click pattern from a |φ1,l〉-state is smaller, since one more
dark count is required there.
Of course, it is also possible to obtain click patterns with three clicks or even more in the presence of dark counts.
The most straightforward route, which is also the one we followed for our numerical calculations, is to simply interpret
these click patterns as failed physical-level BMs. However, when analyzing especially the patterns with exactly three
detector clicks it is possible to obtain some information on the original Bell state. For example, any click pattern
with exactly one click in three of the four detectors is most likely the result of a |φ1,l〉 state with an additional dark
count, since from a |φ0,l〉 state, two dark counts and a photon loss would be necessary. Thus these patterns could be
interpreted as a (1, ?) result. The same thought implies some other identifications:
• The patterns (2, 1, 0, 0), (1, 2, 0, 0), (0, 0, 2, 1), and (0, 0, 1, 2), which only include detector pairs that would also
click simultaneously in the case of ideal |φ1,0〉 identification, are most probably results of this state and a single
dark count. They could also be the result of a |φ0,l〉 state with a dark count, but the probability of that is
smaller by a factor 4.
• Analogously, the patterns (2, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 2, 0), (0, 2, 0, 1), and (0, 1, 0, 2) correspond to |φ1,1〉.
• Finally, the patterns (2, 0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 2), (0, 2, 1, 0), and (0, 1, 2, 0) correspond to |φ0,?〉.
Simply including these patterns into the acceptance sets for the corresponding Bell state, however, can even reduce
the obtained secure key rate. This is due to the fact that these additional click patterns favor the identification of
Bell states with k = 1: it is very unlikely that a |φ1,l〉 state will be identified as |φ0,?〉, because two dark counts are
required for that. Because of this asymmetry our standard interpretation rules fu(γ) are not well adapted to this
scenario. In fact, it might even be necessary to introduce new, additional classes of BM outcomes, such as (1, 0)∗
which denotes that a (heralded) dark count occurred in the identification as |φ1,0〉 state. Because of the associated
increase in interpretation complexity and the comparatively little gain in the secure key rate or in understanding of
the underlying mechanisms we have decided to focus on the simpler approach of interpreting three-click events as BM
failures and to accept the corresponding reduction of the raw transmission rate.
The BM outcome probabilities P
(dc)
u,v are now obtained by following all possible routes from the undisturbed input
state to the click patterns associated with a given BM result:
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(dc)
1,i = P
(dc)
2,i = P
(dc)
6,i = 0,
P
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3,2 = P
(dc)
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[
p
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(dc)
0→0
)2
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(dc)
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P
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7,1 = P
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6∑
u=1
P
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p
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[(
p
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where we have used the abbreviations pdc = n¯(1 − ηd) for the (approximate) dark count probability and p−1 =
[(1− ηt)ηd + ηt2(1− ηd)ηd] for the (exact) probability to lose one of the two photons of the BM. By furthermore
using η = η2dηt and 
(dc) = p−1pdc we obtain the matrix P (dc) as given in Table VIII.
P
(dc)
u,v |φ0,0〉 |φ0,1〉 |φ1,0〉 |φ1,1〉
(1, 0) (dc) (dc) η(1− 8pdc) + (dc) (dc)
(1, 1) (dc) (dc) (dc) η(1− 8pdc) + (dc)
(0, ?) η (1− 5pdc) + 2(dc) η (1− 5pdc) + 2(dc) 2(dc) 2(dc)
(?, ?) [1− η(1− 5pdc)]− 4(dc) [1− η(1− 5pdc)]− 4(dc) [1− η(1− 8pdc)]− 4(dc) [1− η(1− 8pdc)]− 4(dc)
TABLE VIII. BM outcome probabilities P (dc) in the presence of dark counts. Only the leading terms up to linear order are
displayed.
